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The island of Timor lies some 400 miles off the northwest coast of
Australia, at the tip of the chain of islands forming the Republic of
Indonesia. Before World War II, the western half of the island was
administered by the Netherlands, the eastern half by Portugal. When
Indonesia gained its independence from the Netherlands in 1949, the
western half became Indonesian Timor, a part of Indonesia. Portugal
continued to administer the eastern half of the island, East Timor, until
1975. East Timor was evacuated by the Portuguese authorities in Au-
gust, 1975 during civil disorders condoned, if not fomented by the In-
donesians. Within a few months, Indonesia invaded and annexed East
Timor.
It is estimated that, since 1975, more than 100,000 East Timorese
have died from war, famine, and disease. Most of these deaths oc-
curred after the Indonesian invasion and occupation. This Article ana-
lyzes Indonesia's actions and concludes that they violated international
law, specifically the norms regarding self-determination and
aggression.'
t Professor of Law, Rutgers, the State University School of Law at Camden, N.J.
1. In his syndicated column dated November 8, 1979, Jack Anderson estimated that
about half of the 1975 population, which he gave as 600,000, had been "wiped out by war-
fare, disease and starvation." Anderson, IslandLosing a Lonely Infamous War, Wash. Post,
Nov. 8, 1979, § DC, at 11, col. 4. Most observers would put the number at less, but there is
no doubt that the Indonesians perpetrated a massive human tragedy. The International Red
Cross, which had been actively involved in humanitarian work in the aftermath of the Au-
gust, 1975 civil war, was forced to leave the country at the time of the Indonesian invasion.
The Indonesians did not have the will or the logistical resources to alleviate suffering in the
territory and, until 1979, denied entry to international aid organizations that did have the
capacity to respond. The International Committee of the Red Cross was permitted to return
in October, 1979 but only on a limited basis. After completing an assessment mission to the
territory, the medical coordinator of relief efforts in East Timor of theInternational Com-
mittee of the Red Cross stated in February, 1980 that the situation was among the worst he
had ever seen. Since then, the harshest features of widespread malnutrition appear to have
been overcome, but there is still a great deal of work to be done to alleviate the residual
effects of the invasion. See generally 35 U.N. GAOR, C.4 (9th mtg.) 9, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/
35/SR.9 (1980) (statement of R. Clark), reprinted in CULTURAL SURVIVAL, INC., EAST Ti-
East Timor
I. Recent Political History of East Timor
From the mid-1950s until the mid-1970s, Portugal refused to comply
with United Nations policy regarding the administration of non-self-
governing territories.2 As provided in Article 73(e) of the United Na-
tions Charter, states responsible for the administration of territories
whose people have not yet attained "a full measure of self-govern-
ment" must regularly transmit to the Secretary-General "statistical and
other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social and
educational conditions in the territories. ' 3 When Portugal became a
member of the United Nations in 1955, it claimed to administer no
non-self-governing territories 4 and therefore refused to give to the Sec-
MOR 11 (1981); J. JOLLIFFE, EAST TIMOR (1978); Kamm, The Silent Suffering ofEast Timor,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1981, § 6 (Magazine), at 34; Human Rights in East Timor and the Ques-
lion of the Use of U.S. Equipment by the Indonesian Armed Forces: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on International Organizations and on Asian and Pacfic Affairs of the Comm. on
International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977); Human Rights in East Timor: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm on International Organizations of the House Comm. on Interna-
tional Relations, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1977); Dunn, The East Timor Situation-Report on
Talks with Timorese Refugees in Portugal, 7 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 409 (1977) (this and other
articles prepared by Mr. Dunn, the former Australian Consul in Dili, contain a wealth of
information); S. NICHTERLEIN, 1 THE STRUGGLE FOR EAST TIMOR (mimeo. 1978) (on file
with The Yale Journal of World Public Order); S. NICHTERLEIN, 2 THE STRUGGLE FOR EAST
TIMOR (mimeo. 1979) (on file with The Yale Journal of World Public Order); Hoadley, East
Timor: Civil War-Causes and Consequences, 1976 SOUTHEAST ASIAN AFF. 411; Hoadley,
Indonesia's Annexation of East Timor: Political, Administrative and Developmental Initia-
tives, 1977 SOUTHEAST ASIAN AFF. 133. For a useful compilation of research materials on
East Timor, see K. SHERLOCK, A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF TIMOR (1980). For additional discus-
sion of the legal issues included in the East Timor dispute, see Franck & Hoffman, The Right
of Self-Determination in Very Small Places, 8 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 331 (1976); Elliot,
The East Timor Dispute, 27 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 238 (1978); Suter, International Law and
East Timor, 5 DYASON HOUSE PAPERS 1 (1978).
In addition to Indonesia's violation of the norms regarding self-determination and aggres-
sion in entering and occupying East Timor, the invasion and occupation arguably involved
further illegalities, including breaches of the law of war, human rights violations, and geno-
cide. See Session of the Permanent People's Tribunal on East Timor, reprinted in Note
verbale dated August 11, 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Cape Verde to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doe. A/36/448, Annex at 20-21
(law of war), 21-22 (human rights), and 22 (genocide) (1981); Suter, supra, at 4-5 (law of
armed conflicts); 35 U.N. GAOR, C.4 (9th mtg.) 9, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/35/SR.9 (1980) (state-
ment of R. Clark) (human rights violations). The weakest argument concerns genocide. See
Clark, Does the Genocide Convention Go Far Enough? Some Thoughts on the Nature of Crim-
inal Genocide in the Context of Indonesia's Invasion of East Timor, 8 OHIO N. L. REv. (forth-
coming 1981). Indonesian leaders' intentions in respect of the Timorese were certainly
dishonorable, but it is doubtful that a tribunal similar to the proposed International Crimi-
nal Court would find that Indonesia intended to destroy the Timorese people.
2. See Comment, Portuguese Africa: A Brief History of United Nations Involvement, 4
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 133 (1974).
3. U.N. CHARTER art. 73(e).
4. 11 U.N. GAOR (656th plen. mtg.) 1143, 1149, U.N. Doc. A/PV.656 (1957).
In 1951, Portugal adopted a constitutional amendment redefining Portuguese colonies,
including East Timor, as "overseas provinces." However, as a report prepared for the U.N.
Secretariat noted,
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retary-General any information regarding its territories. Motivated in
part by Portugal's non-compliance, 5 the General Assembly adopted
Resolution 1541(XV), delineating principles which should guide mem-
bers in determining whether they are required to transmit the informa-
tion required by Article 73(e) of the Charter. Principle IV of
Resolution 1541(XV) provides that aprimafacie obligation to transmit
information exists when a territory is geographically separate and eth-
nically and/or culturally distinct from the country responsible for its
administration. 6 Given the ethnic and physical differences between
Portugal and its overseas territories, 7 Portugal clearly was subject to
Article 73(e) reporting requirements, a point the General Assembly
made when it declared Portugal responsible for transmitting informa-
tion about its territories, including "Timor and dependencies." 8 Portu-
gal, however, took the position that this declaration was beyond the
authority of the General Assembly and refused to comply.9
A stalemate between Portugal and the United Nations continued un-
[t]he dejure change in status in the Territories. .. was not accompanied by defacto
changes in their government and administration. Nevertheless, the Portuguese regime
persisted in declaring that Portugal was a pluricontinental state and refused in conse-
quence to take any steps towards the self-determination and independence of its over-
seas territories.
U.N. Dep't of Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonization, Issue on East Timor
DECOLONIZATION, Aug., 1976, at 39 [hereinafter cited as Issue on East Timor].
5. G.A. Res. 1541, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 29, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960) [herein-
after cited as G.A. Res. 1541(XV)]. For a summary of the history behind G.A. Res. 1541
(XV), see 1960 U.N.Y.B. 44-48.
6. G.A. Res. 1541(XV), supra note 5. Principle IV is supplemented by Principle V,
which provides that
[o]nce it has been established that such aprimafacie case of geographical and ethnic or
cultural distinctness of a territory exists, other elements may then be brought into con-
sideration. The additional elements may be, inter alia, of an administrative, political,
juridical, economic or historical nature. If they affect the relationships between the
metropolitan State and the territory concerned in a manner which arbitrarily places the
latter in a position or status of subordination, they support the presumption that there is
an obligation to transmit information under Article 73(e) of the Charter.
Id.
7. East Timor is over 14,000 miles from Portugal. Except for a few thousand persons of
Chinese, European, and mixed ancestry, most of the population is of Timorese origin. Phys-
ically, the East Timorese display a mixture of Malay and Melanesian traits. 9 ENCYCLOPE-
DIA BRITANNICA 1017 (1974).
8. G.A. Res. 1542, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 30, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960) [herein-
after cited as G.A. Res. 1542(XV)].
9. 15 U.N. GAOR (948th plen. mtg.) 1285, 1293-94, U.N. Doc. A/PV. 948 (1960). Por-
tugal's argument rested on two bases. First, that U.N. Charter Chapter XI, of which Article
73(e) is part, is a mere declaration, creating no legal obligation to transmit information
about non-self-governing territories. Second, that even assuming Article 73(e) prescribed a
legal duty, Portugal, the administering nation, and not the General Assembly, had the sole
authority to determine whether its territories fell within the scope of Article 73(e). Id. See
generally F. NOGUERIA, THE UNITED NATIONS AND PORTUGAL (1963).
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til April, 1974 when a new regime succeeded to power in Lisbon.10 The
new government accepted its duties under Chapter XI and adopted a
constitutional amendment recognizing the Portuguese territories' right
to self-determination and independence." Questions remained, how-
ever, as to how, when, and under whose auspices self-determination
would be accomplished. Timor was an outpost of the Portuguese Em-
pire, and the new regime in Lisbon had neither the resources, nor ap-
parently the will, to take bold steps towards its decolonization.
In the power vacuum created by Lisbon's abandonment of efforts to
administer the decolonization of East Timor, three political parties
emerged, each seeking to direct the decolonization process to different
ends. 12 The Frente Revolucianaria de Timor Leste Independente
(FRETILIN) wanted independence after a short transitional period;
the Associacao Popular Democratica de Timor (APODETI) advocated
integration with Indonesia; the Uniao Democratica de Timor (UDT)
desired "progressive autonomy" but with continued Portuguese pres-
ence.' 3 By 1975, FRETILIN appeared to be the leading party.'
4
Using its strong position, FRETILIN undertook diplomatic efforts to
obtain support for East Timorese independence. To this end, FRE-
TILIN sought to allay the fears of Indonesia and secure its support.' 5
Jos6 Ramos Horta, the Minister for External Affairs, assured the In-
donesians that an independent East Timor under FRETILIN leader-
10. The Caetano regime was succeeded in April, 1974 by the Junta of National Salva-
tion. N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1974, at 1, col. 3.
11. The amendment was adopted on July 24, 1974. See Report of the Special Commit-
tee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 30 U.N. GAOR, 2 Supp. (No. 23) 34,
U.N. Doc. A/10023/Rev. 1 (1975). In the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly,
Portuguese representatives reaffirmed their nation's recognition of its obligations under
Chapter XI. 29 U.N. GAOR, C.4 (2080th mtg.) 3, 7, U.N. Doc. A/C. 4/SR. 2080 (1975).
12. For background on these parties, see Issue on East Timaor, supra note 4, at 8-12.
13. See id. at 8.
14. See Report of the Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Imple-
mentation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, supra note 11, at 35-36; 35 U.N. GAOR, C.4 (11 th mtg.) 7, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/35/
SR.I 1 (1980) (statement of E. Traube), reprinted in CULTURAL SURVIVAL, INC., EAST TIMOR
24 (1981) (FRETILIN was well on its way to enjoying wide popular support in November,
1974).
15. In July, 1974, FRETILIN also made diplomatic efforts to win Australian support.
At that time, it failed to obtain an Australian commitment to support independence. See
Issue on East Timor, supra note 4, at 12. Further efforts in December resulted in a public
statement by Australia supporting the "right of self-determination" of the people of East
Timor. See id; 93 AUSTL. PARL. DEB., H.R. (Hansard) 644 (1975) (referring to Australia's
support for "measured and deliberate" decolonization of East Timor resulting in self-deter-
mination); Report of the Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implemen-
tation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, supra note 11, at 34.
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ship would maintain close and friendly relations with Indonesia, and
would neither support separatist movements within Indonesia nor per-
mit such movements to use Timorese territory as a base of operations
against Indonesia.16 These demonstrations of goodwill succeeded. By
letter dated June 17, 1974,17 Indonesia stated that:
I. The independence of every country is the right of every nation with
no exception for the people in Timor.
II. The government, as well as the people of Indonesia, have no inten-
tion to increase or expand their territory, or to occupy other territo-
ries other than what is stipulated in their Constitution. This
reiteration is to give you a clear idea, so that there may be no doubt
in the minds of the people of Timor in expressing their own
wishes.18
III. For this reason, whoever will govern in Timor in the future after
independence can be assured that the Government of Indonesia will
always strive to maintain good relations, friendship and cooperation
for the benefit of both countries.
As concrete steps were taken towards the independence of East Ti-
mor, Indonesia's position began to change. In January, 1975, FRE-
TILIN and UDT formed an alliance and began to negotiate with
Portugal for a transitional government that would lead to indepen-
dence-a goal to which UDT had also come to aspire.19 Indonesian
spokesmen thereafter began to suggest that independence was not an
option available to East Timor. Comments were made about the terri-
16. Interview with Jos6 Ramos Horta, in New York City (Jan. 15, 1981) (on file with The
Yale Journal of World Public Order). Indonesia is struggling with secessionist movements in
West Irian, the South Moluccas, and Aceh (Northern) Sumatra. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 11,
1971, at A6, col. 1 (discussing South Moluccas); Jakarta's Most Sensitive Spots, FAR EAST-
ERN ECON. REV., Aug. 4, 1978, at 24 (discussing West Irian and Aceh Sumatra).
17. J. JOLLIFFE, supra note 1, at 66.
18. In fact, no particular territory is stipulated in the Indonesian Constitution. See
McBeath, Indonesia, in 7 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (1973). Rep-
resentatives of the Republic of Indonesia, however, have made several explicit statements
denying any intent to expand into East Timor. For example, in the course of the general
debate at the General Assembly's Fifteenth Session in 1960, the then foreign minister of
Indonesia said,
[wle are declaring the right of the Indonesian people to be sovereign and independent
within all the territory formerly covered by the Netherlands East Indies. We do not
make any claim to any other part of the Indonesian archipelago. Indonesia explicitly
does not make any claim at all to territory such as that in Borneo or Timor which lies
within the Indonesian archipelago, but was not part of the Netherlands East Indies.
15 U.N. GAOR (888th plen. mtg.) 431, 451, U.N. Doc. A/PV.888 (1960).
In 1957, in the First Committee, the Indonesian representative said, "Indonesia had no
claims on any territories which had not been part of the former Netherlands East Indies. No
one should suggest otherwise or advance dangerous theories in that respect." 12 U.N.
GAOR, C.I (912th mtg.) 243, 247, U.N. Doc. A/C.I/SR.912 (1957).
19. Issue on East Timor, supra note 4, at 14.
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tory's backwardness and lack of economic viability,20 and Jakarta dis-
seminated misinformation about the status and condition of East
Timor.21 In particular, FRETILIN was portrayed as a leftist party that
planned to deliver the country to the Communists. Such an event al-
legedly would undermine regional security.22
The alliance between UDT and FRETILIN soon began to break
down, and no agreement acceptable to both parties could be reached
with the Portuguese. UDT leaders were in contact with Indonesia
throughout July and August of 1975, and apparently were warned that
Indonesia would not tolerate an independent East Timor unless imme-
diate steps were taken against FRETILIN and an anti-communist front
was established. 23 With this tacit support, UDT seized power on Au-
gust 11, 1975, and demanded immediate independence and the impris-
onment of FRETILIN leaders.24 Fighting broke out between
FRETILIN and UDT.25 The Portuguese were in no position to control
the situation.26 Large numbers of the Portuguese military deserted to
FRETILIN, and on August 29, the Governor and remaining Portu-
guese military and civilian personnel withdrew from the capital, Dill,
to the nearby island of Atauro.27 By mid-September, 1975, FRETILIN
had taken control of a substantial part of the country,28 and on Novem-
ber 28, 1975, it declared the independence of the "Democratic Republic
20. Id. at 14-15.
21. Nichterlein, The Strugglefor East Timor-Prelude to Invasion, 7 J. CONTEMP. ASIA
489-90 (1977).
22. Issue on East Timor, supra note 4, at 15-16. By April, 1975, officials in the Australian
Department of Foreign Affairs believed that "the Indonesians remain unshaken in their
resolve that, ultimately, Portuguese Timor should become part of Indonesia." At'that time,
the Australians still believed that Indonesia would not invade East Timor.
The Indonesians have assured us at all levels that they are not contemplating military
intervention. There is a less strident tone to Indonesian propaganda. Latest intelli-
gence reports reveal no preparations for early military action. The Portuguese, mean-
while, have reaffirmed their willingness to follow a very gradual time table for
decolonization in Timor. This seems to be acceptable to the political groupings on the
ground, as well as to the Indonesians.
Brief for Minister for Foreign Affairs, April, 1975, reprintedin DOCUMENTS ON AUSTRALIAN
DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICY 1968-1975 189 (1981) [hereinafter cited as DOCUMENTS].
23. Issue on East Timor, supra note 4, at 18; N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1975, at A2, col. 1.
24. Issue on East Timor, supra note 4, at 19.
25. See Report on Visit to East Timor by Senator Arthur Gietzelt and Representative
Ken Fry, Members of Australian Parliament (mimeo., Sept. 1975) (on file with The Yale
Journal of World Public Order); Issue on East Timor, supra note 4, at 19.' Two to three
thousand people lost their lives in the fighting between the two groups, while "thousands"
crossed the frontier into Indonesian Timor to escape the war. Id.
26. Kamm, supra note 1, at 56.
27. Id.; Issues on East Timor, supra note 4, at 19.
28. In the period between the defeatof the UDT forces and the Indonesian invasion, the
FRETILIN administration succeeded in reestablishing law and order and in restoring essen-
tial services to towns in East Timor. According to J. S. Dunn, former Australian Consul-
The Yale Journal of World Public Order Vol. 7:2, 1980
of East Timor. ' '29 Two days later a coalition of APODETI, UDT, and
two smaller parties, KOTA and Trabalhista, denounced FRETILIN's
action and declared the independence and integration of East Timor
with the Republic of Indonesia.30
General in East Timor, FRETILIN leaders were warmly received by the Timorese people
wherever they went. Issue on East Timor, supra note 4, at 23.
29. J. JOLLIFFE, supra note 1, at 208-15. At least two factors contributed to FRETILIN's
decision to declare the independence of East Timor. First, FRETILIN leaders had been
heavily influenced by the events occuring in other Portuguese territories, particularly
Mozambique and Angola. Thus the decision made earlier in the month by the Movimento
Popular del Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) to declare independence encouraged FRETILIN
leaders to follow a similar course. A second factor in FRETILIN's decision was the deterio-
ration of FRETILIN's diplomatic relations with Australia and Indonesia. This deteriora-
tion was reflected in a cable from the Australian Ambassador to Indonesia wherein he
noted:
We are all aware of the Australian defence interest in the Portuguese Timor situation
but I wonder whether the Department has ascertained the interest of the Minister of the
Department of Minerals and Energy in the Timor situation. It would seem to me that
this Department might well have an interest in closing the present gap in the agreed sea
border and this could be much more readily negotiated with Indonesia by closing the
present gap than with Portugal or independent Portuguese Timor.
I know I am recommending a pragmatic rather than a principled stand but that is
what national interest and foreign policy is all about, as even those countries with ideo-
logical bases for their foreign policies, like China and the Soviet Union, have
acknowledged.
Cable from the Australian Ambassador to Indonesia to the Department of Foreign Affairs
(Aug. 17, 1975) reprinted in DOCUMENTS, supra note 22, at 197-200. Having lost some of its
regional support, FRETILIN thought it expedient to appeal to the world community. FRE-
TILIN reasoned that, as a political party, it carried no weight in the world political arena
and could therefore only watch helplessly as the Indonesians slowly but systematically en-
croached upon their territory. J. JOLLIFFE, supra note 1, at 216. As a sovereign nation,
however, it would be possible to appeal to the world community, and in particular to the
U.N., for moral and material support. According to the FRETILIN Minister for External
Affairs, Jos6 Ramos Horta, FRETILIN's declaration of independence was ultimately recog-
nized by fifteen governments: Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Sao
Tome and Principe, Albania, Benin, Cambodia, People's Republic of China, People's Re-
public of Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea (Conakry), Democratic Republic of Korea, Laos, Vi-
etnam, and Tanzania. Interview with Jos6 Ramos Horta, supra note 16.
30. Issue on East Timor, supra note 4, at 29. For the text of this proclamation, see Letter
dated December 4, 1975, from the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the Secretary-
General, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/808 (1975). The Portuguese Government rejected both the
FRETILIN proclamation of independence and the pro-Indonesian parties' declaration of
integration with Indonesia. See Communiqu6 by the Portuguese National Decolonization
Commission (Nov. 27, 1975), reprinted in U.N. Docs. A/10403 & S/ 11890 (1975). Shortly
after these declarations, a draft resolution was introduced in the Fourth Committee of the
General Assembly. It was designed to bring all the parties together with a view towards
establishing conditions that would enable the East Timorese to exercise their right to self-
determination and independence in a peaceful manner and in an atmosphere of security and
tranquillity, free from any threats or coercion. It also requested Portugal and all Timorese
political parties to make every effort to find a peaceful solution and requested the Special
Committee on Decolonization to send a fact-finding mission to the Territory as soon as
possible. See 30 U.N. GAOR, C.4 (2180th mtg.) 356, 358, U.N. Doc. A/C. 4/SR.2180
(1975). A revised version of the draft, circulated on December 6, added a paragraph af-
firming that "any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and
the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the Purposes and Principles of the
East Timor
On December 7, 1975, Indonesian forces invaded East Timor.31 On
December 18, Adam Malik, the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, an-
nounced the establishment of a "provisional government" in East
Timor.32
At the United Nations, both the General Assembly and the Security
Council reaffirmed East Timor's right to self-determination and called
for Indonesia's withdrawal from the territory.33 The Security Council
also requested the Secretary-General to send a Special Representative
to assess the situation first-hand.34 United Nations efforts proved inef-
fective,35 however, and support for East Timorese independence eroded
Charter of the United Nations." The revised draft also removed a paragraph that had
lauded "the positive attitude of the administering Power in making every effort to find a
solution by peaceful means." Draft resolution revision submitted by Australia, Fiji, Indone-
sia, Japan, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, and Thailand, U.N. Doe. A/C.4/
L. 1125 Rev. 1 (1975). See 30 U.N. GAOR, C.4 (2184th mtg.) 390, 396, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/
SR. 2184 (1975). In retrospect, the revision, apparently instigated by Indonesia, seems to
have been calculated to set up two later Indonesian arguments: (I) that Timor was part of
the national territory of Indonesia and that the "integrity" of Indonesia should be preserved,
see note 79 infra, and (2) that because of the "criminal negligence" of Portugal, Indonesian
intervention was justified, see note 161 infra.
31. Letter dated December 7, 1975 from the Permanent Representative of Portugal to
the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1 1899
(1975).
32. J. JOLLIFFE, supra note 1, at 272.
33. On December 11, the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly adopted a resolu-
tion deploring the Indonesian invasion and calling for the withdrawal of Indonesian troops.
30 U.N. GAOR, C.4 (2188th mtg.) 407,412, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/SR.2188 (1975). On Decem-
ber 12, the General Assembly adopted a similar resolution by a vote of 72 to 10, with 43
abstensions. G.A. Res. 3485, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 118, U.N. Doc. A/10034
(1975) [hereinafter cited as G.A. Res. 3485 (XXX)]. Of the dissenting nations, Benin re-
jected the resolution because it merely "deplored", rather than "categorically condemned"
Indonesia's action. 30 GAOR, C.4 (2188th mtg.) 407, 409, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/SR.2188
(1975). India, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Quatar Saudi Arabia, and Thailand sup-
ported Indonesia. U.N. Doc. A/GA. 5438 at 262 (1975). The tenth "no" vote was cast by
Indonesia. The Security Council unanimously called for the withdrawal of Indonesian
forces and reaffirmed East Timor's right to self-determination. S.C. Res. 384, 30 U.N.
SCOR, Resolutions and Decisions 10, U.N. Doc. S/Res/384 (1975) [hereinafter cited as S.C.
Res. 384].
34. S.C. Res. 384, supra note 33, para. 5.
35. Secretary-General Waldheim appointed Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi, Director-
General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, as his Special Representative. Report of
the Secretary-General in pursuance of Security Council Resolution 384, 31 U.N. SCOR,
Supp. (Jan.-Mar. 1976) 119, U.N. Doc. S/12011 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Report of the
Secretary-General]. Winspeare Guicciardi contacted representatives of the interested par-
ties in New York, Australia, Jakarta, Kupong in West Timor, and in areas under the control
of the "Provisional Government," including the enclave of Oecusse, the Island of Atatdro,
the capital city Dili, Matuto, and Bacau on the island's north coast. Attempts were made in
conjunction with FRETILIN officials in Australia to visit FRETILIN-held areas, but com-
munication and transportation difficulties, aggravated by the Australian and Indonesian
governments, frustrated these attempts. Id. at 121; J. JOLLIFFE, supra note 1, at 276-77 (Aus-
tralian government confiscated radio link used by Winspeare Guicciardi). Air fields sug-
gested by FRETILIN for use by the U.N. party came under Indonesian attack, apparently in
an effort to sabotage this part of the mission. Report of the Secretary-General, supra. As a
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as time passed.36 Indonesia moved ahead with military operations and
the incorporation of East Timor into its territory. 37
The "Provisional Government" invited the United Nations Special
Committee on Decolonization, the President of the Security Council,
and the Secretary-General to attend the first meeting of a "Regional
Popular Assembly" in Dili on May 31, 1976.38 The invitations were
declined. 39 The meeting that took place in Dili was over in less than
two hours and was witnessed by seven foreign diplomats. 40 The "Re-
gional Popular Assembly" unanimously adopted a resolution request-
ing integration with Indonesia.41 On June 7, 1976, following the
meeting in Dili, a delegation of the representatives of the people of East
Timor formally presented to President Suharto of Indonesia a petition
requesting integration.42 On June 24, 'Indonesia dispatched a "fact-
finding" mission to East Timor to ascertain the "wishes of the Peo-
ple." 43, Based on a favorable report of this fact-finding mission, the
Indonesia parliament approved a bill for the integration of East Timor
into Indonesia. 44 Despite Indonesia's declared incorporation of East
result of these events, Winspeare Guicciardi concluded that "any accurate assessment of the
situation as a whole remains elusive." Id. at 122.
36. In contrast with the December, 1975 Security Council resolution, which was adopted
unanimously, the United States and Japan, in April, 1976, abstained on a resolution that
reiterated the operative paragraphs of the December resolution, S.C. Res. 389, 31 U.N.
SCOR, Resolutions and Decisions 18, U.N. Doe. S/Res/389 (1976). See Issue on East Ti-
mor, supra note 4, at 62-63. For subsequent General Assembly action, see note 49 infra.
The decline in support for East Timorese independence may have resulted, in part, from
intense efforts by Indonesian diplomats to win support for their position. More than one
foreign office found that its entire diplomatic relationship with Indonesia was "on the line"
in this regard. (Author's conversations with officials and representatives at the United
Nations).
37. Issue on East Timor, supra note 4, at 64.
38. Id.
39. See id.; Note by the President of the Security Council, 31 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Apr.-
June 1976) 65, U.N. Doc. S/12104 (1976); Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 35.
40. Diplomats from India, Iran, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and
Thailand were present. See Issue on East Timor, supra note 4, at 37 n. 157; Wash. Post, June
1, 1976, at A17, col. 3. Among other nations, Australia and Japan apparently declined simi-
lar invitations, and as a consequence, incurred the wrath of the Indonesians. J. JOLLIFFE,
supra note 1, at 289. The Philippines was also apparently invited and had accepted; how-
ever, no representative of the Philippines was present. Sonpong, Report of the Thai Repre-
sentative to the Popular Assembly (S. Miller trans. 1975) (on file with The Yale Journal of
World Public Order) [hereinafter cited as Report of the Thai Representative to the Popular
Assembly].
41. See Issue on East Timor, supra note 4, at 37.
42. Letter dated June 15, 1976, from the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the
Secretary-General, 31 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Apr.-June 1976) 60-61, U.N. Doc. S/12097, An-
nex 11 (1976).
43. Issue on East Timor, supra note 4, at 38. Foreign diplomats and members of the
press were also present during the mission's visit. INDONESIA DEP'T OF INFORMATION, PRO-
CESs OF DECOLONIZATION IN EAST TIMOR 38 (1976).
44. N.Y. Times, July 18, 1976, at A7, col. 1. For an unofficial translation of this bill, see
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Timor into the Republic of Indonesia, FRETILIN military activity
continued on a significant scale until 1978-79. 45 This activity appears
to be continuing, but at a lower level.46
In December, 1976, the General Assembly again called upon Indo-
nesia to withdraw its forces and deplored its failure to comply with the
previous General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.47 It re-
jected the claim that East Timor had been integrated into Indonesia,
declaring that the people had not been able to exercise freely their right
to self-determination. Resolutions critical of the Indonesian actions
have been passed in each subsequent session of the General Assem-
bly.48 Nevertheless, Indonesian diplomacy gradually eroded the sup-
port formerly shown for East Timor.49
II. Self-Determination and East Timor
The Indonesian invasion and occupation of East Timor violate two
fundamental norms of international law. First, Indonesia's actions de-
prived East Timor of its right to self-determination. Second, military
intervention into East Timor constituted an act of aggression forbidden
by the United Nations Charter and customary law. The United Na-
tions itself deplored the invasion and called for the withdrawal of Indo-
nesian troops. 50
Indonesia has disputed that its acts are invalid. But defenses asserted
explicitly, as well as those suggested in Indonesia's public statments,
fail adequately to rebut charges that is has violated the principle of self-
determination and engaged in unjustifiable and illegal acts of
INDONESIA DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DECOLONIZATION IN EAST TIMOR, Annex XIII
(1976).
45. See Kamm, supra note 1, at 62.
46. Id. at 35; Jolliffe, Refugees Stil Talk of Famine and Repression, in EAST TIMOR IN-
TERNATIONAL CONFERENCE REPORT 7, 10 (1981).
47. G.A. Res. 31/53, 31 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 125, U.N. Doc. A/31/362 (1976).
48. G.A. Res. 32/34, 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 45) 169, U.N. Doc. A/32/357 (1977);
G.A. Res. 33/39, 33 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 45) 181, U.N. Doc. A/33/455 (1978); G.A.
Res. 34/40, 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 46) 206, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979); G.A. Res. 35/
27, 35 U.N. GAOR (Agenda Item 85) 1-3, U.N. Doc. A/Res/35/27 (prov. ed. 1980).
49. The 1980 resolution was adopted by a vote of 58 to 35 with 46 abstensions and a
further 14 states "absent." See Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assem-
bly During the First Part of its Thirty-Fifth Session 375-76, U.N. Doe. GA/6375 (1981).
Indonesia, however, continues to be unsuccessful in preventing the question of East Timor
from being included on the agenda of the General Assembly. In 1980, for example, Indone-
sia made an unsuccessful effort in the General Committee of the General Assembly (which
handles the agenda) to have the matter dropped. See U.N. Doc. A/BUR/35/SR. 1 at 13-14
(1980).
50. G.A. Res. 3485, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 118, U.N. Doe. A/10426 (1975);
S.C. Res. 384, supra note 33; S.C. Res. 389, 30 U.N. SCOR, Resolutions and Decisions 18,
U.N. Doe. S/Res/389 (1975).
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aggression.5'
Indonesia has offered three explanations of its efforts to integrate
East Timor in terms of self-determination. First, Indonesia has argued
that integration with Indonesia is the will of the East Timorese people
and thus constitutes self-determination. Second, Indonesia has sug-
gested that, regardless of any explicit consent to integration, the histori-
cal, ethnic, cultural, and geographical ties between Indonesia and East
Timor establish East Timor as an integral part of the Indonesian archi-
pelago. If one accepts this proposition, administration of East Timor
by any authority other than Indonesia violates Indonesia's territorial
integrity and conflicts with United Nations doctrine. Finally, Indone-
sia has argued that East Timor is not economically viable and requires
direction and assistance from an economically stable state before it can
be expected to survive as an independent state.
None of these defenses withstands scrutiny. Reviewing each argu-
ment merely underscores the illegality of Indonesia's actions.
A. East Timorese "Expressions of Will"
United Nations doctrine recognizes that non-self-governing territo-
ries have the right to self-determination.5 2 That right entitles each ter-
51. Indonesia has not made a comprehensive legal case for its actions. Its positions have
been gleaned mainly from the statements of its representatives in the General Assembly and
the Security Council and from three Indonesian publications: INDONESIA DEP'T OF INFOR-
MATION, PROCESS OF DECOLONIZATION IN EAST TIMOR (1976); INDONESIA DEP'T OF FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS, DECOLONIZATION IN EAST TIMOR (1976); Nahar, Some Historical Notes on
Timor Island, INDONESIAN NEWS AND VIEWS, Nov. 8, 1975 at 1. The author is indebted to
Mr. Juwana of the Indonesian Mission to the United Nations for providing him with infor-
mation on the Indonesian point of view.
52. Self-determination is recognized as a fundamental international norm in the Charter
of the United Nations. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 55, 56. International law has recognized
that the principle of self-determination applies to all non-self-governing territories. See Le-
gal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), [1971] I.C.J. 16, 31.
The Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara defended the universality of the principle of self-
determination, despite the fact that:
in certain cases the General Assembly has dispensed with the requirement of consulting
the inhabitants of a given territory. Those instances were based either on the considera-
tion that a certain population did not constitute a "people" entitled to self-determina-
tion or on the conviction that a consultation was totally unnecessary, in view of special
circumstances.
Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, [1975] I.C.J. 12, 33.
The principle of self-determination has been defined as "the need to pay regard to the
freely expressed will of peoples." Id. See Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16), 66, U.N.
Doc. A/4684 (1960) [hereinafter cited as G.A. Res. 15 14(XV)]; Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Ac-
cordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 28) 121, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970). For a general discussion of the right of self-deter-
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ritory to choose the status it will assume on completing
decolonization.5 3 General Assembly resolutions recognize that territo-
ries have at least three alternatives: emergence as a sovereign state, free
association with an independent state, or integration with a sovereign
state.5 4
Indonesia contends that it did not deprive East Timor of self-deter-
mination because, by four acts, the East Timorese people indicated
their preference for integration with Indonesia. The four acts include
the November, 1975 Proclamation by four parties sympathetic to union
with Indonesia, 55 the May, 1976 resolution of the East Timor "Re-
gional Popular Assembly,' ' 56 the subsequent petition to the Indonesian
president and parliament,5 7 and the Indonesian fact-finding mission of
June, 1976.58
None of these acts satisfies the conditions set forth by the General
Assembly for a legitimate and genuine expression of will to integrate
with a sovereign state. Principle IX of G.A. Resolution 1541(XV)
(Principle IX) provides that:
(a) The integrating territory should have attained an advanced stage of
self-government with free political institutions, so that its peoples would
have the capacity to make a responsible choice through informed and
democratic processes.
(b) The integration should be the result of the freely expressed wishes of
the Territory's peoples acting with full knowledge of the change in their
status, their wishes having been expressed through informed and demo-
cratic processes impartially conducted and based on universal adult suf-
frage. The United Nations could, when it deems it necessary, supervise
these processes. 59
mination, see R. EMERSON, SELF-DETERMINATION REVISITED IN AN ERA OF DECOLONIZA-
TION (1964); A. RIGO-SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION
(1973); C. TOUSSAINT, THE TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1956); SELF-
DETERMINATION: NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS (Y. Alexander & R.
Friedlander eds. 1980); Chen, Self-Determination as a Human Right, in TOWARD WORLD
ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY 198 (W. Reisman & B. Weston eds. 1976).
53. Self-determination has been identified as a right of all peoples and as a means to
bring colonial situations to a speedy conclusion. See G.A. Res. 1514(XV), supra note 52;
Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara [1975] I.C.J. 12, 32.
54. These alternatives may not exhaust the alternatives available to territories. See Dec-
laration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 121, 124, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970) (accepting as valid alterna-
tives "any other political status freely determined by a people").
55. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
56. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
57. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
58. See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
59. G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), supra note 5.
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Two of the four acts do not even pretend to satisfy Principle IX.
Neither the November, 1975 proclamation issued by the coalition of
four parties, nor the June, 1976 fact-finding mission resembled in any
way the plebiscite required by Principle IX.
The remaining two acts cited by Indonesia, the East Timor Popular
Assembly and the subsequent petition to Indonesia presented by dele-
gates of the representatives of East Timor, did pay at least lip service to
the spirit of Principle IX.60 On review, however, they also prove inade-
quate. Contrary to Principle IX, the representatives to the Regional
Popular Assembly were not elected by a process respecting universal
adult suffrage. In any event the election was not impartially conducted.
There is no evidence that the people of East Timor understood the con-
sequences of the available choices, and little evidence to suggest that
East Timor had achieved that stage of self-government necessary for a
people to shape its destiny. As the Regional Popular Assembly was
unlawfully chosen, the petition it subsequently presented to Indonesia
was also unlawful.
1. "Universal Adult Suffrage"
A law passed by the "Deliberative Council of East Timor," a body
created at the same time as the "Provisional Government of East Ti-
mor," established the formalities for convening the Regional Popular
Assembly.6' The Act provided that the Regional Popular Assembly be
composed of the "Deliberative Council of East Timor," supplemented
by representatives from each of the thirteen Conselhos or districts of
East Timor. In each district, a Conselho Popular Assembly was to be
formed that would choose the district's two or three representatives to
the Regional Assembly.62
Even if the Regional Popular Assembly was designed to represent
the will of the East Timorese people, it fell far short of satisfying the
standards of Principle IX. First, representatives to the Regional As-
sembly were not elected according to the principle of universal adult
suffrage. Rather, the Act provided that "[s]olely in the capital City of
60. See Issue on East Timor, supra note 4, at 37.
61. Act No. 1/A.D. 1976 of the "Provisional Government of East Timor", reprinted in
Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 389 (1976), 31 U.N.
SCOR, Supp. (Apr.-June 1976) 66, U.N. Doc. S/12106, Appendix (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Act No. 1/A.D. 1976].
62. Id. For a description of the Portuguese administrative structure, which introduced
the system of the thirteen Conselhos, see Report of the Special Committee on the Situation
With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to




Dili representatives for the Conselho Popular Assemblies and the Re-
gional Popular Assembly will be elected in accordance with the [princi-
ple of] one man/one vote." In the other districts representatives to the
Conselhos Popular Assemblies were to be chosen in accordance with
the tradition and identity of the people of East Timor, meaning a repre-
sentative system by means of "consensus and consent. ' 63 As a result,
only five of twenty-eight representatives to the "Regional Popular As-
sembly" were elected by popular vote.64
The absence of a public record of the proceedings makes it particu-
larly difficult to determine who in fact participated in the elections and
whether district elections represented the will of the people. It has, in-
deed, been asserted that only five of the twenty-eight delegates who
participated in the proceedings were actually elected.65
2. "Processes Impartialy Conducted"
It is also doubtful that the Regional Popular Assembly was con-
ducted impartially, as required by Principle IX. Although Principle IX
does not require United Nations observation of a consultation, the
United Nations, in fact, has a long history of involvement in consulta-
tions with populations, and, in some circumstances, has provided some
assurance of the impartiality of the electoral process. 66 The United Na-
63. Act No. I/A.D. 1976, supra note 61, arts. 2, 5. What the law meant by "consensus
and consent," which must refer to something other than one person, one vote, is unclear and
remains unexplained. The law apparently envisaged some form of consultation of tradi-
tional leaders, but the nature and extent of any such consultation has not been revealed.
64. It might be suggested that conditions in East Timor were such that a consultation
based on one person, one vote could not have been achieved within a reasonable period of
time after the 1974 Portuguese change of government. However, it should be noted that in
cases where a status other than independence was considered by the United Nations, an
expression of will has almost invariably been ascertained by an election or referendum con-
ducted on this basis-regardless of how difficult conditions might have made efforts to con-
duct such a vote. For a discussion of examples of such referenda, see note 67 infra (British
Togoland, Northern Cameroons, Southern Cameroons) and note 75 infra (Cook Islands,
Niue, Marina Islands, Papua New Guinea).
65. S. NICHTERLEIN, 2 THE STRUGGLE FOR EAST TIMOR 26 (mimeo. 1979) (on file with
The Yale Journal of World Public Order).
66. The United Nations has regularly supervised plebiscites leading to integration of
former colonies with independent states. It supervised plebiscites that led to the union of
British Togoland with the Gold Coast to form Ghana in 1956, the Northern Cameroons
with Nigeria in 1961, and the Southern Cameroons with the Cameroun Republic in 1961.
U.N. Dep't of Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonization, Fifteen Years of the United
Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
DECOLONIZATION, Dec., 1975, at 19 [hereinafter cited as Fifteen Years]. Although United
Nations involvement in an alleged act of self-determination generally contributes to the le-
gitimacy and impartiality of the proceeding, the U.N.'s participation in the West Irian "act
of free choice" resulting in integration with Indonesia represents a stain on the U.N.'s rec-
ord. The U.N. acquiesced in a consultation that did not recognize the principle of one per-
son, one vote. Moreover, the consultation effectively was conducted by Indonesia which
"exercised at all times a tight political control over the population." Report of the Secretary-
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tions, however, declined to supervise the East Timor consultation, and
the observers that were present were diplomats from states arguably
sympathetic to Indonesia.6 7 In any event, the conditions under which
the diplomats observed the Assembly left them little opportunity to ob-
serve. Neither the diplomats nor attending journalists were permitted
to interview members of the Assembly.6 8 Moreover, because the
speeches were delivered in Portuguese, many of the diplomats and
journalists were unable to understand them.69 The fact that the report
of only one observer is available casts further doubt on what role, if
any but a cosmetic one, the diplomats were expected to play and were
able to play.70
General Regarding the Act of Self-Determination in West Irian, 24 U.N. GAOR, 2 Annexes
(Agenda Item 98) 2, at 20, U.N. Doc. A/7723, Annex 1 (1969). While the General Assembly
did not approve the result of the "act of free choice," it passed a resolution taking note of
this act. See G.A. Res. 2504, 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 3, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969).
This resolution passed by a vote of 84-0, with 30 abstentions. 24 U.N. GAOR, (1813th
mtg.), I, at 17, U.N. Doc. A/PV. 1813 (1969).
67. See note 40 supra (list of nations that sent observers). India, Iran, Malaysia, Saudi
Arabia, and Thailand all voted in support of Indonesia. New Zealand abstained. Of the
seven states that had sent representatives to the "Popular Assembly," only Nigeria voted for
the resolution. See G.A. Res. 3485 (XXX), supra note 33. Nigeria has abstained in General
Assembly votes on the subject since 1978. Since 1979, New Zealand, on the other hand, has
voted with Indonesia.
Several factors may explain this pattern of voting. Iran and Saudi Arabia apparently have
cast their votes to support a fellow Islamic state or OPEC member. While Nigeria can be
similarly described, its performance in the General Assembly indicates a continuing senti-
ment in favor of genuine self-determination for East Timor. This sentiment is perhaps a
reflection of Nigeria's own colonial experience. Malaysia and Thailand, like Indonesia, are
members of the Association of South East Asian States (ASEAN). (The other two ASEAN
members, the Philippines and Singapore, have also supported Indonesia, the Philippines
with some enthusiasm. The Philippines had accepted an invitation to attend the meeting in
Dili but its representative did not arrive). Since Britain entered the European Economic
Community, an action that resulted in New Zealand's losing a substantial portion of the
British market for agricultural goods, New Zealand has made a substantial effort to con-
vince South East Asian states that it has a significant stake in the area. While Indonesia
does not conduct substantial trade with New Zealand, as the largest ASEAN member it is
perceived by New Zealand to be the key to New Zealand's diplomacy in the area. India was
perhaps still grateful to Indonesia for its diplomatic support at the time of India's invasion of
Goa in 1961. It may also have been embarrassed by the way it had absorbed its protector-
ate, Sikkim, in 1974-75, and saw some similarities between that action and the Indonesian
incorporation of East Timor.
68. The Times (London), June 1, 1976, at 6, col. 1; Wash. Post, June 1, 1976, at A17, col.
3.
69. See Letter from the New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs to Roger Clark (May
15, 1981) (on file with The Yale Journal of World Public Order).
70. The role of the United Nations or other observer group in an act of self-determina-
tion is to ensure impartiality and fairness. The failure of the seven diplomats at the Popular
Assembly to make public reports contrasts sharply with the practice of United Nations ob-
servers, see supra note 66, and with the observers at the 1980 Zimbabwe elections who pub-
lished their reports, see 1980 KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES 30373.
The author endeavored to obtain copies of the reports from each of the seven govern-
ments. The Thai Mission to the United Nations kindly transmitted a four-page report (in
Thai). The report is a factual account of events and is somewhat critical of the haste with
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The absence of effective third party supervision of the Regional As-
sembly is particularly troublesome in view of the many reasons to sus-
pect that the entire process was a sham conducted either by the
Indonesians themselves, or by factions under their influence. The As-
sembly was conducted under the auspices of the "Deliberative Council
of East Timor,' ' 71 which insisted on speedy proceedings. 72 Even if the
Council and the Assembly were not controlled by the Indonesian gov-
ernment, there is every reason to believe both were composed of people
which the Assembly was convened and of the absence of its consideration of any alternative
other than integration with Indonesia. See Report of the Thai Representative to the Popular
Assembly, supra note 40. The New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote:
While I am not prepared to release the full text of the report-which was a confiden-
tial report to the New Zealand Government-I have no objection to letting you know
the gist of the document.
In short, while the observer's assessment was that the Council in a "serious, business-
like and formal way" unanimously endorsed integration with Indonesia, the occasion
left a number of unanswered questions surrounding the self-determination process in
East Timor. Subsequent to this event, the New Zealand Government continued to
press Indonesia, as a fellow member of the United Nations, to do what it could to get
the United Nations involved in the self-determination process.
You raise the question of the language in which the proceedings took place. The
proceedings were in Portuguese and apparently only some parts of it were translated
into English. Our observer does not speak Portuguese but made an informal arrange-
ment to have a "running commentary" provided by a Timorese. This was, however,
very much a second best to being provided with a full and accurate translation.
Letter from the New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs to Roger Clark (May 15, 1981) (on
file with The Yale Journal of World Public Order).
The Counsellor to the Indian Mission to the United Nations wrote:
Regrettably, we are unable to send you a copy of the Ambassador's report as it is a
confidential document which has not yet been released to the public. But it might be of
interest to you to know that our Ambassador felt that since the village chiefs attended
the Assembly, there was obviously consensus among the people of East Timor in favour
of integration with Indonesia.
Letter from the Counsellor to the Indian Mission to the United Nations to Roger Clark (Jan.
29, 1981) (on file with The Yale Journal of World Public Order).
The Charg6 d'Affaires of Saudi Arabia reported, "I am sorry to inform you that the gen-
tleman in question was unable to present a report to the Government due to the fact that he
died of a heart attack four days after the meeting mentioned in your letter." Letter from the
Charg6 d'Affaires of Saudi Arabia to Roger Clark (Jan. 22, 1981) (on file with The Yale
Journal of World Public Order). No substantive replies were received from the other gov-
ernments involved.
71. No explanation of the origin of the Deliberative Council, sometimes referred to as
the Advisory Council, appears in the various documents forwarded to the Secretary-General
by Indonesia, or in the Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolu-
tion 389, 31 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Apr.-June 1976) 66, U.N. Doc. S/12106 (1976). In remarks
to the Security Council in April, 1976, Mr. Guilherme Goncalves, Chairman of the Advisory
Council of the "Provisional Government," stated that the Council was established to help
the "Provisional Government" in reaching "important decisions," and was to function as a
provisional assembly pending the appointment of the People's Assembly. 31 U.N. SCOR
(1908th mtg.) 71, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1908 (1976). Because there is no reference in any source
to an election for the Council, its members were presumably "appointed." Whether it
adopted any laws other than Act No. I/A.D. 1976, supra note 61, is not known.
72. The Assembly completed its business in under two hours, so any debate by necessity
would have been brief. Wash. Post, June 1, 1976, at A17, col. 3.
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sympathetic to integration with Indonesia. 73 In any event, it cannot be
said with conviction that the consultation was impartially conducted;
integration was the only item on the Assembly's agenda and no other
alternatives appear to have been debated.74
3. "Full Knowledge"
Principle IX also provides that the Territory's peoples should make a
responsible choice with "full knowledge of the change in their status."
The United Nations has frequently insisted that authorities undertake
an educational campaign fully and fairly presenting the relevant issues.
There is no record that such a campaign was launched. Nor is there
any evidence to suggest that the East Timorese people were well-in-
formed about or had any access to information regarding the conse-
quences of integration with Indonesia. That the consultation and
designation of representatives took place during the Indonesian occu-
pation and continuing fighting suggests that, at best, the people were
acting under circumstances unlikely to foster an informed and respon-
73. Id.; The Times (London), June 1, 1976, at 6, col. 1.
74. No U.N. or neutral third-party observers were present for the selection of the repre-
sentatives to the Assembly. The observers present at the actual meeting of the Assembly
itself were not able to determine the representativeness of the proceedings. Wash. Post, June
1, 1976, at A17, col. 3. See text accompanying notes 68-70 supra. Moreover, the armed
conflict in East Timor-whatever its origin and nature-with its resulting dislocation and
starvation, reduced the ability of the East Timorese fully to exercise their right to self-deter-
mination according to the intent of G. A. Res. 1514(XV), supra note 52. See Kamm, supra
note I; Anderson, supra note 1.
It is instructive to contrast the formation and actions of the "Deliberative Council" and
the Regional Popular Assembly with other exercises of the right of self-determination. The
United Nations has a long history of involvement with consultations of population prior to
an act of self-determination. See Fifteen Years, supra note 66, at 19-22. In cases where a
status other than independence was considered, an election or referendum conducted on the
basis of one person, one vote has been the usual practice-no matter how difficult to achieve,
given the level of development of the society concerned. See, e.g., Report of the United
Nations Special Representative for the Supervision of the Elections in the Cook Islands,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/L.228 (1965); Report of the United Nations Special Mission to Ob-
serve the Act of Self-Determination in Niue, U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/L.982 (1974); Report of
the United Nations Special Mission to Observe the Plebiscite in the Mariana Islands Dis-
trict, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, June 1975, 43 U.N. TCOR, Supp. (No. 2) 27-30,
41, U.N. Doc. T/1771 (1976). Because the General Assembly regarded East Timor as also
subject to Chapter XI of the Charter, the precedents of such referenda should have applied.
Furthermore, any argument that conditions in East Timor could not have permitted a
consultation based on one person, one vote within a reasonable time after the Portuguese
change of government in 1974 must be viewed in the light of Australia's success at organiz-
ing such elections in Papua New Guinea since 1964. J. RYAN, THE HOT LAND 371 (1969).
Conditions in Papua New Guinea in 1964 were roughly comparable to those in East Timor
ten years later--at least prior to the Indonesian invasion. The United Nations observed one
of the Papua New Guinea elections in 1972 and went to great length to commend the thor-
oughness and fairness with which it had been conducted. Report of the United Nations
Visiting Mission to Observe the Elections to the Papua New Guinea House of Assembly in
1972, 39 U.N. TCOR, Supp. (No. 2) 33-38, U.N. Doe. T/1739 (1972).
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sible choice.75
4. "Advanced Stage of Se/f-Government"
For similar reasons, it is unlikely that the consultation with the East
Timorese people satisfied the provision of Principle IX declaring that
the "territory should have [already] attained an advanced stage of self-
government with free political institutions." It can hardly be said that
the Portuguese did much to put the Territory in such a state.76 Argua-
bly, during its defacto control of the country from September to De-
cember, 1975, and possibly during the earlier period of its coalition
with UDT, FRETILIN had facilitated East Timor's advancement to-
ward self-government. But whatever success FRETILIN had was cer-
tainly destroyed by the Indonesian invasion.
In view of the deficiencies of the four acts said to express the will of
the East Timorese people and the non-compliance with Principle IX,
the U.N. refused to recognize that the East Timorese had exercised self-
determination. Indonesia's reliance on these four events as genuine
acts of will proved unacceptable to most States. Consequently its inva-
sion and occupation of East Timor, as well as its formal declaration of
integration, must be judged grave violations of East Timor's right to
self-determination.
B. 'Historic, Ethnic, and Cultural Ties" Between Indonesia
and East Timor
Indonesia has made several statements appealing to the geographic,
historic, ethnic, and cultural ties uniting it with East Timor. All of
them suggest that East Timor is an integral part of the Indonesian na-
tion. Though Indonesia has not explicitly relied upon these observa-
tions to defend its invasion of East Timor, it used similar arguments to
justify its integration of West Irian.
Shortly before the Indonesian invasion, the Indonesian representa-
tive to the Fourth Committee, while defending Indonesia's interest in
the peace and stability of East Timor, pointed out the geographical,
cultural, and ethnic ties between Portuguese or East Timor and Indone-
sian Timor:
The 450 years of division resulting from colonial domination had not di-
minished the close ties of blood and culture between the people of the
Territory and their kin in Indonesian Timor. That geographical proxim-
ity and ethical [sic] kinship were important reasons for Indonesia's con-
75. See text accompanying notes 31-42 supra.
76. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
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cern about peace and stability in Portuguese Timor, not only in its own
interest, but also in the interest of Southeast Asia as a whole. 77
The President of Indonesia forcefully made this geographic and eth-
nic argument at the time of the incorporation of East Timor into Indo-
nesia. On that occasion, he emphasized historical connections with
East Timor.
This archipelago was once united, with an area approximately the size of
the present territory of the unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.
History noted the famous Srivijaya Kingdom, as well as the well-known
Majapahit Kingdom.
But history should also note an inglorious chapter and a misfortune that
befell us. For three and a half centuries we were a colonialized nation,
our soul was oppressed and our body exploited. As I have mentioned
earlier, we were separated from our own brothers, we were splintered into
small groups. But the heritage of sharing one common destiny had never
disappeared. The spirit to become independent had never been
quenched.7 8
The symbolic appeal of the ancient empires of Srivijaya and
Majapahit has proved to be an extremely powerful rhetorical device in
the hands of Indonesian leaders. It was used in 1945 when President
Sukarno first spoke in favor of uniting within an independent Indone-
sia the territories it allegedly controlled at the time of the Srivijaya and
Majapahit kingdoms. He contended then that a fully restored Indone-
sian nation would include East Timor.79 The case is a weak one. The
exact extent of the Srivijaya and Majapahit empires, and their legal ties
to the outlying part of the Indonesian archipelago, including Timor, are
lost in history. 0 If anything, the ethnic and cultural roots of the East
77. 30 U.N. GAOR, C.4 (2180th mtg.) 359, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/SR. 2180 (1975).
78. Statement by President Suharto in response to the address presented by the delega-
tion of the Provisional Government of East Timor, reprintedin 31 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Apr.-
June 1976) 62-64, U.N. Doc. S/12097, Annex V (1976).
79. Srivijaya and Majapahit were recalled by Sukarno in his famous Pan/ia S/a (Five
Principles) Speech of June 1, 1945, in which he asserted that "the national state is only
Indonesia in its entirety, which existed at the time of Srivijaya and Majapahit, and which
now, too, we must set up together." B. GRANT, INDONESIA 30 (1967). However, no claim
was'madd to East Timor at the time of the formal declaration of Indonesian independence in
August, 945, and any aspirations for its incorporation were expressly disavowed by Indone-
sia in the 1950s and 60s, see note 18 tupra.
80. The most explicit expression of the "ethnic ties" argument appears in a November,
1975 press release from the Indonesian Embassy in Washington. See Nahar supra note 51.
It makes the point that Timor is geographically part of the Indonesian archipelago. It then
argues that "[e]thnically, the people living in the Portuguese controlled part of the island of
Timor (East Timor) are the same as the people of Indonesia. . . ." Id. at 1. The statement
maintains that, in the past, Timor was under the administration of the Srivijaya and
Majapahit empires.
The Buddhist kingdom of Srivijaya, established in Sumatra in the seventh century, was
the first important political unit with connections throughout the Indonesian archipelago.
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Timorese people and the Indonesians suggest that they are distinct peo-
ples.81 Moreover, any attempt on the part of Indonesia to defend its
invasion on the basis of its historical ties to East Timor is in direct
conflict with its own prior refutations of any intent to claim East Timor
as its rightful territory.8 2
Timor, however, is not mentioned among the vassals of Srivijaya in the leading work in
English, G. COEDES, THE INDIANIZED STATES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA (1968). At its zenith, the
empire may have extended only to the western part of Java. See G. COEDES, THE MAKING
OF SOUTHEAST ASIA 95 (1967). One commentator has characterized Srivijaya as a federa-
tion of trading ports on the Sumatran coast and important islands off the coast. 0.
WOLTERS, THE FALL OF SRIVIJAYA IN MALAY HISTORY 9 (1970). An earlier work by the
same author, 0. WOLTERS, EARLY INDONESIAN COMMERCE (1967), deals with the origin of
the empire but does not in any way clarify the position of Timor with respect to it. In any
event, by the thirteenth century its power had waned and the focus of political power shifted
to Java with the establishment of the Hindu kingdom of Majapahit in 1292.
Scholarly literature discussing the ancient Indonesian empires supports at best a tenuous
tributary relationship between Timor and the Majapahit empire. That empire included
most of the area which later became the Dutch East Indies. G. COEDES, THE INDIANIZED
STATES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA 239-40 (1968). Writings from the period suggest that Timor
sent tribute to the Majapahit court. See B. GRANT, supra note 79, at 8; 4 T. PIEGEAUD, JAVA
IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY 29-35 (1962). Pigeaud, however, considers it doubtful that
Majapahit authority was at any time of much consequence in most of the areas mentioned
by the ancient writers and notes that the writers' knowledge of geography seems uneven. Id.
Majapahit lasted for about two centuries before disintegrating with the arrival of Islam and,
later, the western colonialists. INDONESIA: THE SUKARNO YEARS 3 (H. Kosut ed. 1967).
Thus, even if the two kingdoms extended so far as to Timor, these ties were crumbling
before the first Portuguese made contact with the island in 1512 and certainly were in abey-
ance before the first serious colonization effort by the Dutch in 1651. Issue on East Timor,
supra note 4, at 6. References to the two ancient empires were also made in arguments
concerning the inclusion of West Irian in Indonesia and during the "confrontation" with
Malaysia over the inclusion of North Borneo and Sarawak in that country. S.
NICHTERLEIN, I THE STRUGGLE FOR EAST TIMOR 13 (mimeo. 1978) (on file with The Yale
Journal of World Public Order).
81. So far as the geographic proximity of Timor to the rest of the Indonesian Archipel-
ago is concerned, no one has suggested seriously that the post-colonial world must be a
"tidy" one and no claim based solely on geographic contiguity has ever been given the
slightest countenance by the United Nations.
On the facts, the ethnic similarity argument carries little weight. The heart of the Indone-
sian Republic is Java and Sumatra. The Timorese probably have more in common with the
Melanesians of Papua New Guinea in terms of racial characteristics and language than they
do with the Javanese and Sumatrans. Mr. Ramos Horta stressed this argument before the
Security Council. 31 U.N. SCOR (1908th mtg.) 23, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1908 (1976). Perhaps
because of these difficulties, Indonesia has not made an express claim to East Timor exclu-
sively based on ethnic ties. East Timor does, of course, have ethnic ties with West Timor as
well as Molucca and West Irian, all areas encompassed by the Indonesian Republic. All of
these areas, however, are on the outer fringes of Indonesia and their ethnic ties 'with the
heartland of the Republic hardly seem of such importance as to eclipse the right of the East
Timorese to determine their own status. If, theoretically, the ethnic linkage is as strong and
important as Indonesia seems to think, an exercise in self-determination by the East
Timorese would result in a vote to join their "brothers" as a part of the Indonesian Republic.
Moreover, any ties which may have existed in the fifteenth century have certainly become
much weaker today. This would occur not merely through the inevitable passage of time,
but also through the impact of four hundred years of colonial administration by various
Western powers; the Portuguese and the Dutch, themselves very different.
82. See text accompanying notes 17-18 supra. In addition to undercutting the geo-
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1. "Legal" Bases of Indonesian Claims,- The Western Sahara Opinion
Indonesia's arguments are rooted in historical inaccuracies. Indone-
sia never fully articulated the significance of the historical origins alleg-
edly shared by East Timor and the rest of the Indonesian archipelago.
Quite possibly, Indonesia had in mind the argument that for certain
former colonial territories, self-determination is synonomous with
graphic, ethnic, and historical case, Indonesia's previous statements arguably support a fur-
ther substantive argument against its actions. Previous decisions of the I.C.J. indicate that in
certain circumstances states may be bound by "unilateral declarations." In the Legal Status
of Easterh Greenland, [1933] P.C.I.J. ser. A/B, No. 53, it was held that Norway was bound
by a declaration of its Foreign Minister, made in the context of negotiations with Denmark,
that "the plans of the Royal [Danish] Government respecting Danish sovereignty over the
whole of Greenland. . . would meet with no difficulties on the part of Norway." Id. at 58.
Later steps by Norway to occupy parts of Greenland accordingly were held to be "unlawful
and invalid." Id. at 75. Even if the declaration did not constitute a definitive recognition of
Danish sovereignty over Greenland, it did constitute an obligation on the part of Norway to
refrain from contesting Danish sovereignty over Greenland. The doctrine of the Eastern
Greenland Case was carried somewhat further by a bare majority of the Court in the Nu-
clear Tests Cases, Australia v. France, [1974] I.C.J. 253, 267-68; New Zealand v. France,
[1974] I.C.J. 457, 472-73. The French Government, in a series of statements, announced its
intention to discontinue atmospheric testing in the Pacific. These statements had not been
made specifically in the course of diplomatic negotiations with the Applicant States, Austra-
lia and New Zealand. Nevertheless, the Court held that they were binding on the French
Government.
It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning
legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations. Declara-
tions of this kind may be, and often are, very specific. When it is the intention of the
State making the declaration that it should become bound according to its terms, that
intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the State being
thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent with the declara-
tion. An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound,
even though not made within the context of international negotiations, is binding. In
these circumstances, nothing in the nature of a quidpro quo nor any subsequent accept-
ance of the declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from other States, is required for
the declaration to take effect, since such a requirement would be inconsistent with the
strictly unilateral nature of the juridical act by which the pronouncement by the State
was made.
[1974] I.C.J. at 267; [1974] I.C.J. at 472.
What is meant in these cases by the manifestation of an intent to be bound is obscure, but
the Indonesian statements appear to show as much intent as the statement in these cases.
The Malik statement to Ramos Horta is similar to the statement of the Norwegian Foreign
Minister in that it was made in a "diplomatic" setting with Ramos Horta. It is distinguisha-
ble from that statement, however, in that it was not made to a representative of a govern-
ment. FRETILIN would no doubt argue that Ramos Horta was the representative of a
"people" at the relevant time and that this should be sufficient. Indonesia's other statements
are similar to statements of the French government and thus could be relied upon by the
world at large including FRETILIN and the people of East Timor. The binding effect of the
Indonesian statements was espoused in the June, 1981 decision of the Permanent Peoples'
Tribunal sitting in Lisbon. See Session of the Permanent People's Tribunal on East Timor,
supra note 1, at 16 (citing the Nuclear Tests Case). But see Rubin, The International Legal
Effects of Unilateral Declarations, 71 AMJ.INT'L L. 1 (1977) (expressing some skepticism
about the doctrinal basis of the Court's analysis of the unilateral declaration rule, especially
as formulated in the Nuclear Tests Case). See generally I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUB-
LIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 637-38 (3d ed. 1979).
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reincorporation into the greater entity of which it was a part before the
colonial occupation. 83 This attitude arguably derives from the events
surrounding the Western Sahara Opinion and paragraph six of General
Assembly Resolution 15 14(XV),8 4 but in fact, they do not provide sup-
port for Indonesia's position.
The International Court of Justice confronted the "historical origins"
argument in its Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara.85 The case arose
as a result of an attempt by Morocco and Mauritania to prevent inde-
pendence for the Western Sahara. Instead, each government hoped to
incorporate part of Western Sahara into its own territory.86 In order to
delay a referendum that had been recommended by the U.N.,'Morocco
and Mauritania argued that, before colonial occupation, Western Sa-
hara constituted an integral part of their territories and that such his-
torical ties merited consideration in shaping decolonization. 87 United
83. Assertions of a precolonial right to decolonized territories have been advanced with
some success by India and China. India used such an argument to defend its armed seizure
of the Portuguese territories (Goa, Damao, and Diu) in December, 1961. See Wright, The
GoaIncident, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 617 (1962). India also argued that it was necessary to act to
deal with disturbances within Goa and to respond to Portuguese border incursions. N.Y.
Times, Dec. 19, 1961, at 14, col. 3. See note 88 infra.
Shortly after the government of the People's Republic assumed the Chinese seat at the
United Nations, its representative wrote to the Chairman of the Special Committee With
Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colo-
nial Countries and Peoples:
As is known to all, the questions of Hong Kong and Macau belong to the category of
questions resulting from the series of unequal treaties left over by history, treaties which
the imperialists imposed on China. Hong Kong and Macau are part of Chinese terri-
tory occupied by the British and Portuguese authorities. The settlement of the ques-
tions of Hong Kong and Macau is entirely within China's sovereign right and does not
fall under the ordinary category of 'colonial Territories.' Consequently, they should not
be included in the list of colonial Territories covered by the Declaration on the Grant-
ing of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. With regard to the questions
of Hong Kong and Macau, the Chinese Government has consistently held that they
should be settled in an appropriate way when conditions are ripe. The United Nations
has no fight to discuss these questions. For the above reasons, the Chinese delegation is
opposed- to including Hong Kong and Macau in the list of colonial Territories covered
by the Declaration and requests that the erroneous wording that Hong Kong and Ma-
cau fell under the category of so-called 'colonial Territories' be immediately removed
from the documents of the Special Committee dnd all other United Nations documents.
March 8, 1972 from the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations ad-
dressed to the Chairman of the Special Committee, U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/396 (1972). Hong
Kong and Macau were removed from the Committee's list.
The rationale seems to have been that if Hong Kong and Macau were left on the list of
non-self-governing territories, the inference might be drawn that independence was a future
option for them.
84. G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), supra note 52, at para. 6.
85. Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, [1975] I.C.J. 12.
86. Franck & Hoffman, supra note 1, at 339.
87. Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, [1975] I.C.J. 12, 65-66.
In the Western Sahara case, the Court was asked:
I. Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of colonization
by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)?
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Nations' acquiesence in the "retrocession" to Morocco of the Spanish
enclave of Ifni apparently stood as precedent for that claim. It seems
that Ifni had been part of Morocco before being acquired by Spain. It
was "restored" to Morocco following negotiations with Spain that were
not seriously concerned with the democratically expressed will of the
people of Ifni.88
In its sometimes puzzling opinion, the I.C.J. took a nuanced position
with regard to decolonization and the "free and genuine expression of
the will of the peoples concerned." 89 While acknowledging the impor-
tance of the peoples' will in any exercise of self-determination, the
Court noted that, in "certain cases," the General Assembly had dis-
pensed with the need for consultations. In such situations the General
Assembly had decided that either the concerned population did not
"constitute a 'people' entitled to self-determination" or that, given the
special circumstances involved, a consultation was not necessary. 90
The Court then proceeded to establish that in the case of Western Sa-
If the answer to the first question is in the negative,
II. What were the legal ties between this Territory and the Kingdom of Morocco and
the Mauritanian entity?
The first question was readily answered in the negative in view of the existence at the time of
Spanish colonization of organized tribes in the area and the fact that Spain did not claim the
territory by occupation. Rather Spain based its claim on treaties of protection with repre-
sentatives of the inhabitants. When the Court turned its attention to the second question,
Mauritania faced an additional hurdle in its effort to establish legal ties with the Western
Sahara as it did not exist as a state in 1884, the time of the Spanish colonization of the
Western Sahara.
88. Id. at 34. The General Assembly's consensus decision to take note of the settlement
between Spain and Morocco of the Ifni matter hardly constitutes a strong endorsement of
the propriety of the retrocession. It is, however, the only decision of the Assembly that the
writer can find that comes close to an express endorsement of a settlement reached by the
transfers of territory without some effort at consulting the population. The transfer of the
French Establishments in India to India in the 1950s was never the subject of an Assembly
resolution and was not discussed as a separate item. For the text of the transfer treaties, see
Treaty of Cession of the Territory of the Free Town of Chandergore, Feb. 2, 1951, France-
India, 203 U.N.T.S. 155; Treaty Ceding the French Establishments in India, May 28, 1956,
France-India, 1962 Recueil des Trait~s et Accords (France) no. 33. India's invasion of Goa
and the other Portuguese territories on the Indian continent in December, 1960, supra note
83, was considered by the Security Council, but the Council could not agree to adopt any
resolutions and the matter simply lapsed. In August, 1961, Dahomey seized the Portuguese
enclave of Fort Sdo Jodo Baptista de Ajudd and ousted what seemed to have been a lone
Portuguese official there. N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1961, at A13, col. 1. Portugal's objection to
Dahomey's action was never the subject of a formal vote in the General Assembly support-
ing or criticizing it, but Dahomey appeared to have more support than Portugal in the dis-
cussion. See 16 U.N. GAOR, C.4 (I 193d mtg.) 233-34, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/SR. 1193 (1961)
(Dahomey claimed the enclave as "an integral part of Dahomey").
89. Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, [1975] I.C.J. 12, 32.
90. Id. at 33. The Court did not enumerate the "certain cases" it had in mind. In con-
text, Ifni was plainly one, although the General Assembly's consensus decision to "take
note" of the retrocession, 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 75, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969), was
hardly a strong endorsement of the resolution of that situation. The author has been unable
to find any other instances where the General Assembly dispensed with a consultation.
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hara, the General Assembly had recognized the right of the indigenous
population "to determine their future political status by their own
freely expressed will" and that this right would not be affected by any
decision the Court might make as to the existence of pre-colonial ties of
territorial sovereignty between Western Sahara and Morocco or Mauri-
tania.91 The Court concluded that the existence of such precolonial ties
might affect the General Assembly's decisions regarding modalities for
the decolonization of Western Sahara in accordance with G.A. Res.
1514(XV).92 But the Court indicated that the significance of such ties
was exclusively dependent on the judgment of the General Assembly. 93
The Court then proceeded to examine the historical evidence and
found that there were no ties of territorial sovereignty between Western
Sahara and Morocco or "the Mauritanian entity" which "might affect
the application of Resolution 1514(XV) in the decolonization"
process. 94
Thus, where, as with the case of East Timor, the General Assembly
has confirmed the population's right to a consultation, 95 the Court has
indicated that historical claims should be treated with considerable
skepticism and that the burden to show the contrary is upon propo-
91. Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, [1975] I.C.J. 12, 36.
92. Id. at 36-37. "As to the future action of the General Assembly, various possibilities
exist, for instance with regard to consultations between the interested States and the proce-
dures and guarantees required for ensuring a free and genuine expression of the will of the
people." Id. at 37. The Court noted that the right of the Saharwi people to self-determina-
tion constituted "a basic assumption of the questions put to the Court." Id. at 36.
93. Id. at 37.
94. As the Court noted:
[t]he materials and information presented to the Court show the existence, at the time of
Spanish colonization, of legal ties of allegiance between the Sultan of Morocco and
some of the tribes living in the territory of Western Sahara. They equally show the
existence of rights, including some rights relating to the land, which constituted legal
ties between the Mauritanian entity, as understood by the Court, and the territory of
Western Sahara. On the other hand, the Court's conclusion is that the materials and
information presented to it do not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the
territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity.
Thus the Court has not found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the application
of resolution 1514(XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of
the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will
of the peoples of the Territory.
Id. at 68.
95. Prior to the issuance of the Advisory Opinion, the General Assembly had confirmed
the right of the Saharwi people to a referendum in nine resolutions: G.A. Res. 2072,20 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 14) 59 U.N. Doc. A/6014; G.A. Res. 2229, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
16) 72, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); G.A. Res. 2354, 22 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 53, U.N.
Doc. A/6716 (1967); G.A. Res. 2428, 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 63, U.N. Doc. A/7218
(1968); G.A. Res. 2591, 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 73, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969); G.A.
Res. 2711, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 100, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); G.A. Res. 2983,
27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 84, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972); G.A. Res. 3162, 28 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 110, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973); G.A. Res. 3292, 29 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 31) 103, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
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nents of such claims. 96 The Court concluded that evidence short of
establishing ties of territorial sovereignty was insufficient to support
historical claims. 97
In view of the Court's rejection in the Western Sahara opinion of
proof stronger than that available to establish pre-colonial Indonesian
ties of territorial sovereignty to East Timor,98 any Indonesian attempt
to assert historical ties to East Timor should fail. Given the General
Assembly's declaration that the East Timorese people are entitled to a
consultation, no colorable claim exists that the decolonization of East
Timor, like that of Ifni and other "certain cases," should be treated in a
special manner.99
In firmly rejecting the notion that reintegration solely on the basis of
historical claims is consistent with the principle of self-determination,
the Western Sahara opinion added to the strength and universality of
the principle of self-determination. Regrettably, the aftermath of the
Western Sahara opinion arguably weakened-the principle. One day
after the I.C.J. opinion was announced, King Hassan II of Morocco
called for a peaceful invasion of Western Sahara to compel Spain to
surrender the territory to the Moroccans.1° ° When the Security Coun-
cil failed to take decisive action, Spain entered into the "Madrid Agree-
ment" ceding the territory to Morocco and Mauritania. 01
In response to this flagrant violation of the principle of self-determi-
nation, the General Assembly reaffirmed the right of the Western Sa-
hara population to self-determination, noted the Madrid Agreement,
and called on the Secretary-General to arrange for a supervised consul-
96. Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, [1975] I.C.J. 12, 41.
97. Id. at 68.
98. The claims of Morocco and Mauritania turned primarily on events which had oc-
curred in the Nineteenth Century as to which there was at least some documentary evidence,
The evidence for Timor's ties to Srivijaya as outlined by Indonesia in Nahar, supra note 51,
depends upon the accounts of travellers. Id. at 1-2. The evidence in respect of Majapahit
primarily depends upon the work of the poet Prapanca. Id. at 2-3. Reliance on the latter is
similar to reliance on William Shakespeare for an accurate history of Denmark,
99. Moreover, even Indonesia consistently has recognized that the inhabitants of East
Timor constitute a "people" for purposes of self-determination, as evidenced by its reliance
on illusory acts of self-determination to defend its invasion and aftermath. See text accom-
panying notes 55-58 supra.
100. Letter dated October 18, 1975, from the Permanent Representative of Morocco to
the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, 30 U.N. SCOR,
Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1975) 17, U.N. Doc. S/11852 (1975).
101. The agreement resulted from secret negotiations between Morocco, Mauritania,
and Spain, conducted in Madrid. The existence of the secret negotiations was disclosed in a
joint communique issued on November 14, 1975. The agreement provided for the partition-
ing of Western Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania and permitted Spain to retain a 35
percent interest in a Saharan phosphate company valued at $700 million. The agreement
also provided for establishing an interim regime that a Spanish governor would administer
with the assistance of Moroccan and Mauritanian deputy governors. Franck & Hoffman,
supra note 1, at 341.
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tation to ascertain the wishes of the population. 10 2 The Moroccans
staged an "act of free choice" in February, 1976 but the United Nations
has never approved it. 103 As a result, the people of Western Sahara still
possess their unexercised right to self-determination.
The failure of the United Nations to take unambiguous and effective
action against Morocco struck a severe blow to the vitality of self-deter-
mination as a legal principle.' 4 Both the Moroccan invasion and the
Madrid Agreement flagrantly violated self-determination and, the
General Assembly ought unequivocally to have denounced them. In
the interest of preserving self-determination as more than an empty as-
piration to those peoples to whom the right has attached, the General
Assembly's subsequent "notice" of the agreement should be considered
an aberration without precedential value. If the General Assembly's
"notice" of the Madrid Agreement does carry some precedential
weight, it lies in the General Assembly's simultaneous affirmation of
the right of the people of the Western Sahara to be consulted on their
future status. Consistently with this position, the General Assembly
directed the interim government to permit a consultation. One should
thus interpret Resolution 3458(XXX) as recognizing the legitimacy of
an interim regime in Western Sahara established and administered by
Spain along with two neighboring states. It should, moreover, be read
to require the termination of that regime upbn the exercise of the peo-
ples' right to self-determination. In view of the aftermath of the West-
ern Sahara opinion, Indonesia's sole plausible claim to East Timor is
as a participant in an interim regime jointly administered with Portugal
102. G.A. Res. 3458A, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 116-17, U.N. Doc. A/10034
(1975). The first part of the resolution reaffirmed of the right of the Saharwi people to self-
determination in accordance with G.A. Res. 1514(XV), supra note 52, and took note "with
appreciation" of the Court's Advisory Opinion. The second part mentioned both G.A. Res.
1514(XV), supra note 52, and G.A. Res. 1541(XV), supra note 5, in its preamble. (G.A. Res.
1541(XV), unlike G.A. Res. 1514(XV), refers to the possibility of integration with an in-
dependent state). It then proceeded to take note of the tripartite agreement and piously to
"request the parties to the tripartite agreement to ensure respect for the freely expressed
aspirations of the Saharan population." G.A. Res. 3458B, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34)
117, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975). For additional discussion of these resolutions, see Franck
& Hoffman, supra note I, at 340-42. For a time, it appeared that the basic principles of the
Court's Opinion had been submerged in an expedient acquiescence by the United Nations in
the Moroccan and Mauritanian actions. Because, however, the Frente POLISARIO has had
significant success in its military struggle against Morocco and Mauritania (which was
forced to withdraw from the part of Western Sahara that it had claimed), General Assembly
resolutions are demonstrating more support for the principles involved. See G.A. Res. 35/
19, 35 U.N. GAOR (56th plen. mtg.) 1-3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/35/19 (prov. ed. 1980) (Gen-
eral Assembly reaffirmation of the right of the Saharwi people to independence and declara-
tion of its deep concern about the continued "occupation" of the Territory by Morocco).
103. U.N. Dept. of Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonization, The Question of
Western Sahara at the United Nations, DECOLONIZATION, Oct., 1980, at 51-52 [hereinafter
cited as The Question of Western Sahara].
104. Id. at 53-60.
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and approved by the General Assembly. Given Portugal's failure to
accept Indonesia's occupation of East Timor and the General Assem-
bly's call for the withdrawal of Indonesian troops, the Moroccan occu-
pation of Western Sahara is weak support for Indonesia's presence in
East Timor. 0 5
2. Paragraph Six of G.A. Resolution 1514(XV
Reintegration of decolonized territories without prior consultation
has been justified as within the contemplation of paragraph six of Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution 1514(XV). Paragraph six provides:
Any attempt aimed at the partial disruption of the national unity and the
territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purpose and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 10 6
The language of paragraph six is opaque and reflects the draftsmen's
confusion about its intended effect.
One reading arguably supports integration without consulting the in-
digenous population where the sovereign nation has a well-established
historical claim to the territory. This interpretation relies on a few
statements by delegates who participated in drafting paragraph six and
denounced the disruption of territories caused by colonial occupation,
thereby suggesting that paragraph six was intended to preserve the in-
tegrity of pre-colonial nations and empires. 0 7
One proponent of this interpretation appears to have been Indonesia.
At one point, Indonesia persuaded the Guatemalan representative to
withdraw a proposed amendment to paragraph six.108 The Guatema-
lan amendment states that "[tihe principle of the self-determination of
peoples may in no case impair the right of territorial integrity of any
State or its right to the recovery of territory." 0 9 The Indonesian repre-
105. The case of East Timor can be distinguished further from the circumstances sur-
rounding that of Western Sahara in at least two ways. First, in contrast to its failure to
condemn unequivocally the Moroccan invasion, the General Assembly adopted a resolution
within five days of the Indonesian bombardment of East Timor's major city, Dili, that
strongly deplored "the military intervention of the armed forces of Indonesia in Portuguese
Timor." G.A. Res. 3485, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 18, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975).
The resolution also called upon Indonesia to withdraw its forces without delay and affirmed
the "inalienable right" of the East Timorese to self-determination. Secondly, unlike Spain,
Portugal has not condoned acts of aggression against its former colony. See note 101 stupra.
On the contrary, the Security Council was convened to consider the situation in East Timor
at Portugal's request, and the Portuguese consistently have condemned Indonesia's actions.
See, e.g., 30 U.N. SCOR, (1864th mtg.) 27, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1864 (1975) (statement of Mr.
Galvao Teles).
106. G.A. Res. 1514(XV), supra note 52.
107. See notes 110-15 infra.
108. 15 U.N. GAOR, (947th plen. mtg.) 1271, U.N. Doe. A/PV. 947 (1960).
109. 15 U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item No. 87) 7, U.N. Doc. A/L. 325 (1960).
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sentative, however, argued that paragraph six as written already pro-
tected the claims of nations to their pre-colonial territory.
When drafting this document my delegation was one of the sponsors of
paragraph 6, and in bringing it into the draft resolution we had in mind
that the continuation of Dutch colonialism in West Irian is a partial dis-
ruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of our
country. "0
Unfortunately, perhaps, the Guatemalan amendment was withdrawn
without a vote."' Its rejection or acceptance could have contributed
significantly to determining whether the Indonesian interpretation of
paragraph six was correct.
Other delegates made statements that seemed to support the Indone-
sian interpretation. Jordan, for example, argued that "[tihe usurpation
of a part of the Arab territory of Palestine by the joint aggression of
colonialism and zionism" was a prime example of a situation within the
reach of paragraph six.1 2 The Moroccan representative explained that
his country supported paragraph six on the assumption that it covered,
inter alia, "the regrettable dismemberment and occupation of Palestine
• ..by this new phenomenon of foreign colonialism known as interna-
tional Zionism," and the "silent tactics of the viper-of French coloni-
alism to partition Morocco and disrupt its national territorial unity, by
setting up an artificial state in the area of Southern Morocco which the
colonialists call Mauritania."' '3 This interpretation has been infre-
quently though forcefully invoked to justify an historical claim to a
neighboring territory.' 14 In at least two instances the General Assem-
bly has countenanced such claims.1 5
A right to reintegrate pre-colonial territory, however, is not the most
favored construction of paragraph six. Rather, states have more often
Guatemala may have been jockeying for position in its dispute with Great Britain over
British Honduras (Belize).
110. 15 U.N. GAOR, (947th plen. mtg.) 1271, U.N.Doc. A/PV. 947 (1960). In view of
its usual argument for sovereignty over West Irian, based on the theory that it succeeded to
all the territory of the former Dutch East Indies, see note 18 supra, Indonesia, paradoxically,
did not need to espouse the broader Guatemalan position. The narrower interpretation of
paragraph six, see notes 119-20 infra, was sufficient to make its case. (The Dutch of course
disputed the point on the merits and argued that West Irian had been administered sepa-
rately from the remainder of the Dutch East Indies and that its peoples were ethnically
distinct.)
111. 15 U.N. GAOR, (947th plen. mtg.) 1271, U.N. Doe. A/PV.947 (1960).
112. 15 U.N. GAOR, (946th plen. mtg.) 1265, 1268, U.N. Doe. A/PV. 946 (1960). The
treatment of Hai may be a third example. See The Question of Western Sahara, supra note
103, at 7.
113. 15 U.N. GAOR, (947th plen. mtg.) 1271, 1284, U.N. Doe. A/PV. 947 (1960).
114. See notes 84 & I IIsupra.
115. See Franck & Hoffman, supra note I, at 371-79 (Gibralter) and 379-84 (Falkland
Islands).
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invoked paragraph six in order to deny one faction of the population of
a non-self-governing territory the right to succession." 1 6 It is this use of
paragraph six that most states contemplated when they approved the
Resolution.
[M]ost states voting for Resolution 1514's paragraph 6 probably did so in
the belief that they were creating a sort of grandfather clause: setting out
the right of self-determination for all colonies but not extending it to parts
of decolonized states and seeking to ensure that the act of self-determina-
tion occurs within the established boundaries of colonies, rather than
within sub-regions. The U.N. debates and their juxtaposition with events
in the former Belgian Congo make clear that the desire to prevent self-
determination from becoming a justification for Katanga-type secessions
was uppermost in the minds of most delegates." 7
More specifically, the underlying purpose was to prevent a part of the
non-self-governing territory, in particular the wealthiest part, from ne-
gotiating a separate agreement with the former colonial power. There
were also fears that the wealthier part might become, apart from the
remainder of the territory, an associate state of that power. The dele-
116. As the Trust Territory of New Guinea approached independence in union with the
Australian territory of Papua, centrifugal forces began to manifest themselves. This was
particularly the case in the island of Bougainville, which is some distance from the New
Guinea mainland and is geographically part of the Solomon Islands. The General Assem-
bly "/sltrong&y endorse[d the policies of the administering Power and the Government of
Papua New Guinea aimed at discouraging separatist movements and at promoting national
unity." G.A. Res. 3109, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 91-92, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
From 1979, the General Assembly has been considering the claim of Madagascar to the
islands of Glorieuses, Juan de Nova, Europa and Bassas de India, which were governed by
the French as part of the Madagascar colonial territory but did not become a part of Mada-
gascar when it became independent in 1960. The Representative of Algeria made the point
clearly in the Special Committee.
Thus even if the islands had not belonged to Madagascar before the French coloniza-
tion, they would have so belonged by virtue of their attachment to Madagascar under
the French occupation. Under the law of secession of states, when a colonial Power
withdrew from its possessions it handed over the territories in question within the same
boundaries which they had during the colonial period. Whenever a colonial Power had
tried to hand over only part of a territory, disputes had arisen which had been resolved
only by ensuring that the entire territory was handed over. Failure to do so violated the
principle that the frontiers of the new State could be defined by reference to its frontiers
under colonial domination.
34 U.N. GAOR, Special Political Committee (38th mtg.) 6, U.N. Doc. A/SPC/34/SR. 38
(1979).
The General Assembly has referred specifically to the preservation of national unity and
territorial integrity in supporting the Madagascar claim. G.A. Res. 34/91, 34 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 46) 82, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979). The Assembly has similarly invoked the
language of paragraph six of G. A. Res. 1514(XV), supra note 52, in support of the claim of
the Comoro Republic to the island of Mayotte over which the French retained control at the
time of Comorian independence. G.A. Res. 35/43, Resolution and Decisions Adopted by
the General Assembly During the First Part of its Thirty-Fifth Session 12, U.N. Doc. GA/
6375 (1980). The Madagascar and Comoro instances appear to be exactly the type of case
that the spokesman for Cyprus had in mind, see note 118 infra.
117. Franck & Hoffman, supra note 1, at 370.
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gate of Cyprus expressed these concerns during the deliberations over
paragraph six, calling it "essential in order to counter the consequences
of the policy of 'divide and rule', which often is the sad legacy of
colonialism and carries its evil effects further into the future."'" 8 Con-
sistent with these statements of purpose is the fact that in subsequent
usage within the United Nations, paragraph six has been invoked pri-
marily to support denying a right of secession to parts of a territory at
or subsequent to independence.' '9 Thus, any attempt on the part of the
Indonesians to invoke paragraph six in their defense is to resort to a
less accepted and little used construction of that provision.
Assuming that paragraph six supports reintegration without prior
consultation with the indigenous population, Indonesia still has no
grounds for invoking it in its defense. First, as discussed in connection
with the Western Sahara opinion, Indonesia's historical claim to East
Timor is spurious at best.' 20 There is no convincing proof that East
Timor ever formed an integral part of the pre-colonial Indonesian em-
pire. Indeed, the ethnic and cultural roots of the East Timorese and the
Indonesians suggest the contrary.' 2' Secondly, also noted above, any
attempt by Indonesia to defend its invasion on such grounds conflicts
with its own declaration that it had no intent to claim East Timor as an
integral part of its colonial or pre-colonial legacy. 22
Any such claims that Indonesia has a right to "reintegrate" East Ti-
mor because of historic, ethnic, and cultural ties, have no factual or
legal basis. Factually, it is unlikely that such ties exist. If they did, they
would not render legal the action in which Indonesia engaged. Neither
the Western Sahara opinion and its aftermath nor paragraph six of
Resolution 1514 credibly support Indonesia's claims.
3. East Timorese "Economic Nonviability"
In statements by Foreign Minister Adam Malik in December, 1974,
the Indonesian government alluded to a possible third defense of its
invasion and occupation of East Timor. Malik contended that inde-
pendence was "not [a] realistic" hope for East Timor in view of "the
backwardness and economic weakness of the population."'' 23 As a re-
sult, only two alternatives were available to the East Timorese:
(1) continued Portuguese rule, or (2) integration with Indonesia.
118. 15 U.N. GAOR, (945th plen. mtg.) 1247, 1255, U.N. Doc. A/PV. 945 (1960).
119. See note 116 supra.
120. See note 80 supra.
121. See note 81 supra.
122. See note 82 supra.
123. Issue on East Timor, supra note 4, at 14.
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Resolution 1514(XV) rebuts any suggestion that a lack of economic
viability is grounds for delaying independence to a non-self-governing
territory. Paragraph two refers to self-determination as a right of "[aill
peoples."' 24 Paragraph three specifically provides that "[ilnadequacy
of political, economic, social and educational preparedness should
never serve as a pretext for delaying independence."'' 25
Aside from its legal defects, the argument that East Timor's eco-
nomic deficiences provide a basis for denying it independence has little
basis in fact. Admittedly, under Portuguese administration, the East
Timorese economy was stagnant and primarily agrarian 26 and Portu-
guese contributions were needed to make up trade deficits. 27 It should
be noted, however, that a 1975 United Nations report describes the
area as having fertile lands, valuable forests, and probably "deposits of
copper, gold, manganese and petroleum."' 28 Clearly, there has been
little, if any, capital development-but widespread starvation became a
problem only after the Indonesian invasion. 29 There is every reason to
believe that East Timor possesses the natural resources with which to
build a viable economy. East Timor's economic potential is under-
scored by the intense interest in the area shown by Australian and
American oil interests. 130 Thus, neither on the facts nor the law, was
East Timor's economic condition a serious impediment to its
independence. 13'
III. Armed Aggression against East Timor
Besides denying self-determination to East Timor by "reintegrating"
it, Indonesia also violated international law by its earlier invasion of,
124. G.A. Res. 1514(XV), supra note 52, at para. 2.
125. Id. at para. 3.
126. Report of the Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementa-
tion of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
24 U.N. GAOR, 2 Supp. (No. 23) 259-61, U.N. Doc. A/7623/Rev.l (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Report of the Special Committee on Decolonization (1969)].
127. Id. at 261.
128. Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementa-
tion of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
30 U.N. GAOR, 2 Supp. (No. 23) 38, U.N. Doc. A/10023/Rev. 1 (1975).
129. Kamm, supra note 1, at 58.
130. J. JOLLIFFE, supra note 1, at 99-100, 295.
131. Should it be suggested that East Timor has inadequate human resources to qualify
for independence, it should be noted that in 1975, the population of East Timor was esti-
mated at between 650,000 and 670,000. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 35, at
para. 7. On that basis, the population of East Timor was larger than that of at least nineteen
U.N. members. See [1975] U.N. Demographic Y.B. 160-64. East Timor could hardly be
regarded as a mini-state. Nevertheless, it should be noted that any discussion in the United
Nations about the danger of a world including numerous mini-states had ended long before
1975. See Gunter, "hat Happened to the United Nations Ministate Problem?, 71 AM. J.
INT'L L. 110 (1977).
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East Timor. As provided in Article 1 of the Charter, one of the pur-
poses of the United Nations is "[t]o maintain international peace and
security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures. . . for
the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace." 32
Article 2 of the Charter establishes "Principles" defining Members' re-
132. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1. The authority to "determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" is lodged in the Security
Council. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. The General Assembly devoted years of prodigious energy
to the attempt to define aggression. Its final product, the "Definition of Aggression," con-
tained in G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR, I Supp. (No. 31) 142, U.N. Doe. A/9631 (1974),
contains numerous ambiguities and circularities-but the core of the Definition clearly ap-
plies to Indonesia's actions:
Article I
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the soVereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition.
Explanatory note: In this Definition the term "State":
(a) Is used without prejudice to questions of recognition or to whether a State is a
member of the United Nations;
(b) Includes the concept of a "group of States" where appropriate.
Article 2
The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute
primafacie evidence of an act of aggression although the Security Council may, in
conformity with the Charter, conclude that a determination that an act of aggression
has been committed would not be justified in the light of other relevant circumstances,
including the fact that the acts concerned or their consequences are not of sufficient
gravity.
Article 3
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, subject to and in
accordance with the provisions of article 2, qualify as an act of aggression:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another
State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or
attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part
thereof...
Id. at 142-43.
For a discussion of the defining process, see B. FERENCZ, DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AG-
GRESSION (1975); J. STONE, CONFLICT THROUGH CONSENSUS (1977). The Definition, which
was adopted by consensus in the General Assembly, is arguably either an authoritative in-
terpretation of the Charter or a codification of customary law. At the very least, Indonesia
appears to have contravened art. 3, para. (a) of the Definition. Professor Stone discusses the
application of the Definition of Aggression to East Timor in light of the Explanatory note to
Article I of the Definition. The whole of his unilluminating discussion is:
As already noticed, the oracular caveat in Explanatory Note (a) to Article 1 of the
Consensus Definition that its use of the term "State" is "without prejudice to questions
of recognition" or of Membership of the United Nations, brought little light to such
matters. The Indonesian military activity in East Timor early in 1976, which
culminated in its virtual annexation, was not in direct conflict with any other pre-ex-
isting State. It is difficult to see how Explanatory Note (a) helps the application of this
Defnition as between Indonesia and the Fretilin forces struggling for independence.
This is because it remains most obscure and debatable, even with Explantory Note (a),
whether and in what sense that Definition is limited to State-to-State aggression. And,
of course, it was arguable that (as with Angola) East Timor still lacked at the time of the
military intervention concerned the stable government necessary for statehood.
Id. at 131 (emphasis in original).
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sponsibility that are intended to implement the purposes of the Char-
ter. 133 Article 2(4) provides:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use offorce against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations. 134
No one disputes that Indonesia used force against East Timor. 135
Moreover, it is clear that Indonesia's use of force was against another
territorial entity, 136 and therefore not a matter within Indonesia's do-
mestic jurisdiction.137
Nevertheless, it might be argued that East Timor was not a "state" at
the time of the Indonesian invasion and hence the provision of Article
133. U.N. CHARTER art. 2.
134. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 (emphasis added).
135. Portugal notified the Security Council of the Indonesian invasion on December 7,
1975. 30 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1975) 66, U.N. Doc. S/11899 (1975). On December
25, the international press reported a second Indonesian attack on East Timor. This report
was confirmed by Portugal. Issue on East Timor, rupra note 4, at 31. The General Assembly
and the Security Council recognized and deplored Indonesia's primary role in the invasion.
G.A. Res. 3485, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 118, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975); S.C. Res.
384 (1975), supra note 33. See generally Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention
in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty,
G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14), II U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965); Declaration
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); 30 U.N. SCOR (1864th mtg.)
21, 28, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1864 (1975) (remarks of Portuguese representative); 31 U.N. SCOR
(1914th mtg.) 26, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1914 (1976) (remarks of Benin representative); 30 U.N.
SCOR (1865th mtg.) 6, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1865 (1975) (remarks of Chinese representative).
The Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and
the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, supra, was invoked against Indone-
sia by the Representative of Guyana, 30 U.N. SCOR (1869th mtg.) 13, U.N. Doc. S/PV.
1869 (1975); 31 U.N. SCOR (1913th mtg.) 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1913 (1976). The Declaration
on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, supra, was applied to Indonesia
by the Representative of Rumania, 31 U.N. SCOR (1914th mtg.) 31, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1914
(1976).
136. First, Indonesia had not yet itself declared the "reintegration" of East Timor into
the Indonesian Republic when it launched its armed attacks. See text accompanying notes
31-44 supra. Second, the very defenses raised by Indonesia to justify its use of force presup-
pose that the invaded territory is not within the sovereign power of the aggressor. See text
accompanying notes 144-83 infra.
137. The United Nations Charter provides that:
[niothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to inter-
vene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or
shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Char-
ter, but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under
Chapter VII.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7. Furthermore, some jurists maintain that decolonization issues
are of international cognizance in the first instance and therefore not within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state. R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 103 (1963).
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2(4) protecting the "territorial integrity" and "political independence"
of a "state" is not applicable. 138 Such a narrow construction of the
138. This (weak) argument was espoused by the Representative of New Zealand in
explanation of his abstaining vote on the General Assembly resolution adopted immediately
after the Indonesian invasion. 30 U.N. GAOR, C.4 (2189th mtg.) 413, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/
SR. 2189 (1975). The Netherlands had made a similar argument in respect of Indonesia in
the 1940s. It was probably a stronger argument as between the Netherlands and its erstwhile
colony, to which a case based on noninterference in internal affairs might be made, than it
was as between Indonesia and a colony under the administration of another state. Never-
theless, the Netherlands' argument was side-stepped by the United Nations. See A. TAY-
LOR, INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE AND THE UNITED NATIONS 355-56, 371-73 (1960). In
spite of the relatively few grants of recognition that East Timor had received on the eve of
the Indonesian invasion, a persuasive case can be made that it was in fact a state, with
FRETILIN its government. The better view of recognition is that it is merely declaratory
and its absence does not preclude the existence of a state or government as the case may be,
if the relevant objective characteristics are met. See I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 91-93 (3d ed. 1979). The characteristics of statehood are usually said
to be (a) a permanent population, (b) a defined territory, (c) a government, and
(d) capacity to enter into relations with other states. 1d. at 74. East Timor on December 7,
1975, with FRETILIN in effective control (control generally being the test for a government)
apparently met those criteria. It should also be noted that in current state practice, formal
recognition or non-recognition is less important than might once have been the case. See
generally RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 11-15
(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981).
Events subsequent to the Indonesian invasion, however, tend to suggest that the Demo-
cratic Republic of East Timor never achieved the status of a state. FRETILIN representa-
tives, supported in their efforts by a letter from the Representative of Guinea-Bissau to the
President of the Security Council, reprinted in 30 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1975) 66,
U.N. Doc. S/I 1911 (1975), arrived in New York on December 11, 1975 to supply the Secur-
ity Council with information regarding the invasion. The Representative of Guinea-Bissau
invoked Rule 39 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council as the basis
of its request. This Rule states, "The Security Council may invite members of the Secreta-
riat or other persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with infor-
mation or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence." Provisional
Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, U.N. Doe. S/96/Rev.6 (1974). The fact that
Guinea-Bissau found it necessary to invoke Rule 39 underscored the tenuous diplomatic
position of the Democratic Republic of East Timor. From the point of view of FRETILIN
and those states that had recognized it as a government, see note 29 supra, the Democratic
Republic of East Timor should have been permitted to participate pursuant to U.N. Charter,
which provides, in relevant part, that:
[a]ny Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or
any state which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under
consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in
the discussion relating to the dispute. The Security Council shall lay down such condi-
tions as it deems just for the participation of a state which is not a Member of the
United Nations.
U.N. CHARTER art. 32. In other colonial situations prior to the East Timor imbroglio, nas-
cent states had successfully invoked Article 32. Indonesia, in its dispute with the Nether-
lands, had enough diplomatic clout to have itself treated as a non-Member state within the
meaning of Article 32. See A. TAYLOR, supra, at 368. (Note the success of the Palestine
Liberation Organization in having itself treated by the Security Council as if it were a mem-
ber state. See F. KIRGIS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING 112-
18 (1977).) In short, the Guinea-Bissau letter probably reflected the reality that, since Portu-
gal had not recognized the Democratic Republic of East Timor, and the United States, Brit-
ain and France (and perhaps the U.S.S.R.) were not eager to offend Indonesia more than
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term "state, ' 139 however, unduly restricts the effectiveness of 2(4). Re-
gardless of what "state" might mean elsewhere in the Charter, 40 for
the purposes of Article 2(4), it should be interpreted in order to serve
the broad objectives of the Charter' 4' and, in particular, the first pur-
pose listed in Article 1: "to take effective collective measures for the
prevention and removal of threats to peace, and for the suppression of
acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace." 142 The very fact that
the term "state" was chosen rather than the more narrow terms "mem-
ber" or "nation" itself suggests that a broader and more comprehensive
interpretation was intended. To this end, the term "state," as used in
Article 2(4), should be considered to include all territorial entities, in-
cluding East Timor.
Even if East Timor were not a state, Indonesia's invasion violated
Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter. Article I prohibits all "acts of aggres-
sion or other breaches ofthe peace," and Article 2 prohibits "the threat
or use of force. . . in any . . . manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations." Those Purposes include "develop[ing] friendly
relations among nations based on respectfor the princvle of equal rights
and sef-determination ofpeoples. . .. ",143 Neither of these provisions
is restricted in its applicability to states. Thus, the Indonesian inva-
sion-an act of aggression, a breach of the peace, and a violation of the
principle of self-determination-violated the U.N. Charter.
Indonesia has attempted to justify its use of force against East Timor
on four grounds: (I) self-defense, (2) invitation by the East Timorese,
(3) future stability of Indonesia and Southeast Asia, and (4) humani-
tarian purposes. Although international law recognizes the legitimacy
of armed intervention into another territory under certain circum-
was absolutely necessary, the votes were simply not there to treat FRETILIN as the govern-
ment of a state.
139. The General Assembly has declared that for purposes of defining aggression, the
term "State," "(a) Is used without prejudice to questions of recognition or to whether a
State is a member of the United Nations; (b) Includes the concept of a 'group of States'
where appropriate." G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 142, U.N. Doc. A/
9631 (1974).
140. See note 141 infra.
141. The term "state" has been broadly interpreted elsewhere in the Charter. For the
purposes of defining membership pursuant to U.N. Charter Article 3, the term "state" was
considered sufficiently broad to include the Ukranian S.S.R. and the Byelorussian S.S.R. as
well as the Philippines and India, the latter two being colonies at the time their membership
in the U.N. was recognized. In its dispute with the Netherlands, Indonesia was treated as a
"state which is not a member of the United Nations" for purposes of Charter Article 32. See
note 138 supra.
142. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. I.
143. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2. (Author's emphasis).
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stances, 144 Indonesia has not shown that its invasion falls within any of
the recognized exceptions.
A. "Se/f-Defense"
Indonesia has attempted to justify its invasion of East Timor as an
exercise of its inherent right to self-defense: "incursions by armed
bands into Indonesian territory had made it necessary for Indonesia to
take appropriate action to prevent territorial violations and the harass-
ment of its people."145 The use of force in self-defense is recognized by
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter as a justifiable interim response to
armed attack until such time as the Security Council undertakes action
"to maintain international peace and security."' 146 The U.N. Charter
doctrine of self-defense contemplates that the use of such force will be
proportional to the precipitating attacks, 147 and requires the defending
state to notify the Security Council of its actions.148
In view of the lack of evidence that East Timorese troops ever
launched unprovoked attacks into Indonesian territory, 149 Indonesia's
invocation of self-defense is suspect. Any fighting involving Indonesia
probably resulted from Indonesian aid-including troops and air and
naval craft-to UDT and APODETI forces using Indonesian Timor as
a sanctuary from which to attack East Timor. 150 Moreover, even if
East Timor did launch unprovoked border incursions into Indonesia,
Indonesia's invasion failed to satisfy the standards of Article 51. Indo-
nesia's armed attack was grossly disproportionate to whatever border
incursions East Timor might have initiated' 5' and Jakarta did not no-
tify the Security Council of its actions.' 52
144. See text accompanying notes 145-83 infra.
145. 30 U.N. GAOR, CA (2180th mtg.) 356, 358, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/30/SR. 2180 (1975).
A similar statement was made in the Security Council, 30 U.N. SCOR (184th mtg.) 37, U.N.
Doc. S/PV. 1864 (1975).
146. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
147. 1. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 261-64
(1963).
148. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
149. Indonesia claimed that FRETILIN shelled towns within Indonesian Timor. Issue
on East Timor, supra note 4, at 27.
150. This allegation by FRETILIN was later confirmed by Australian observers who
visited East Timor during the few months prior to the Indonesian invasion and appears to
have been accepted as accurate by the foreign news media. Issue on East Timor, supra note
4, at 26-27.
151. Logic would seem to indicate that a proportional response to border incursions
would involve nothing more than action taken to secure the border. Such action certainly
would not include a full-scale invasion.
152. Indonesia's only act of "notification" to the Security Council came in response to
the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council. Issue on East
Timor, supra note 4, at 59.
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B. "Invitation" of the East Timorese
Indonesia has also argued that its troops were sent to East Timor in
response to a request "issued on 30 November 1975 by the four polit-
ical parties . . . representing the large majority of the population of
Portuguese Timor."'' 53 That is, Indonesia has claimed that its presence
in East Timor was requested by the people, and intended solely to as-
sist them in establishing conditions for the peaceful and orderly exer-
cise of their right to self-determination.
International law traditionally has recognized the privilege of states
to give military assistance, when requested, to governments of other
states that are engaged themselves in acts of self-defense. 154 Because
such action is characterized as a component of the self-defense doc-
trine,15 5 it is considered to fall within the express recognition of Article
51 of the Charter. The right to assist other states is not, however, un-
limited. In order that the assistance not violate a second state's "terri-
torial integrity or political independence,"' 156 the intervening states
must be invited by the recognized government of the second state. 157
Here, the "invitation" was defective because it did not emanate from
a recognized state government.158 In the same debate in which the In-
153. 30 U.N. GAOR, CA (2187th mtg.) 403, 404, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/30/SR. 2187 (1975)
(statement by representative of Indonesia).
154. See D. BOWETT, SELF DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 200, 205-15 (1958) (col-
lective right of self-defense has long been accepted); I. BROWNLIE, supra note 147, at 321-22,
327, 328-33 (right to assist states has remained part of state practice under U.N. Charter);
Garner, Questions ofinternationalLaw in the Spanish Ci'il War, 31 AM. J. INT'L L. 66, 67-68
(1937) (it is legal to aid "legitimate governments" but illegal to aid insurgents until they
become recognized belligerents); Moore, The Control of Foreign Intervention in Internal Con-
flict, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 205, 245 (1969) ("The traditional rule is said to be that it is lawful to
assist a widely recognized government at its request at least until belligerency is attained.")
But see Farer, Harnessing Rogue Elephants: A Short Discourse on Foreign Intervention in
Civil Strife, 82 HARV. L. REV. 511, 532 (1969) (traditional rule has been eroded to the point
where it has lost its normative capacity and should be replaced by "a rule that would legiti-
mate assistance short of tactical military support, either to incumbents or rebels, but would
proscribe absolutely the commitment of combat troops or battlefield advisers (or 'volun-
teers') no matter how few or how negligible their effect"). This rule clearly would proscribe
the Indonesian action.
155. States that intervene on behalf of, and at the request of a second state are said to be
engaging in an exercise of the inherent right of collective self-defense, a right expressly rec-
ognized in the U.N. Charter. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 147, at
329 ("The express recognition of a right of collective self-defence in Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter gave the right a precise legal status which it perhaps lacked previously."
(Footnote omitted)).
156. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
157. See Garner, supra note 154, at 67-68; I. BROWNLIE, supra note 147, at 327 ("Aid
may be given to the government on the basis of the right assumed to exist in customary law
of aiding a legitimate government." (Footnote omitted).
158. The "invitation" emanated from four political parties that, it was claimed, repre-
sented the large majority of the population of East Timor. 30 U.N. GAOR, C.4 (2187th
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donesian representative to the Fourth Committee characterized the
joint resolution of the four political parties as an invitation, he ac-
knowledged both that no faction could authoritatively claim to repre-
sent the people of East Timor,159 and that Portugal remained the
responsible, albeit criminally negligent, administering power. 60 Given
Indonesia's failure to recognize the four parties or any one of them as
the legitimate government of East Timor,161 and the undisputed fact
that Indonesian intervention was not requested by Portugal, 62 an at-
tempt by Indonesia to legitimate its forceful intervention as a response
to a request must fail.' 63
C. Long-Term Regional "Security"
Indonesia has also attempted to defend its actions on the grounds
that they were necessary to maintain the long-term stability of Indone-
sia and Southeast Asia. 64 The fear that the East Timor conffict would
pose a threat to regional stability was apparently rooted in the proposi-
tion that FRETILIN was a Communist-controlled organization. 65
There is, however, evidence to the contrary. 166 Nevertheless, even if
the proposition were true, the doctrine of self-defense does not recog-
nize a state's right to launch an armed attack as a "prophylactic" meas-
ure to thwart future threats posed by a neighboring state or territory.
And even if a preemptive strike is sometimes lawful, a debatable prop-
osition, the threatened danger must be imminent. 67 FRETILIN posed
mtg.) 403, 404, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/30/SR. 2187 (1975). These organizations could hardly be
considered a recognized state government in view of the fact their invitation was issued two
days after the unilateral declaration of independence by FRETILIN, Issue on East Timor,
supra note 4, at 28, who at the time administered East Timor and enjoyed the overwhelming
support of the population. Id. at 23.
159. 30 U.N. GAOR, C.4 (2187th mtg.) 403, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/30/SR. 2187 (1975).
160. Id.
161. No evidence of Indonesia having granted recognition to these four parties, or any
one of them, as the legitimate government of East Timor appears in the public record.
162. Portugal termed Indonesia's intervention "an act of aggression," severed diplomatic
relations with Indonesia, and called for an urgent meeting of the Security Council, 30 U.N.
SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1975) 53, U.N. Doc. Sf11899 (1975), hardly the response of a state
that had requested Indonesia's intervention.
163. Because the Indonesian argument fails to make out a colorable claim for the legiti-
mate governing status of the four parties who issued the joint declaration of November 30,
1975, other rules associated with the law of collective self-defense need not be considered.
See generally I. BROWNLIE, supra note 147, at 261-65, 269-75, 328-31; R. HIGGINS, supra
note 137, at 197-210; D. BowErr, supra note 154, at 184-99.
164. DOCUMENTS, supra note 22, at 203-07.
165. See Issue on East Timor, supra note 4, at 15-16, 25; DOCUMENTS, supra note 22, at
204.
166. Issue on East Timor, supra note 4, at 10.
167. The so-called right of anticipatory self-defense is generally assumed to be permitted
by customary law in the face of imminent danger. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 147, at 257. Yet
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no such threat.' 68 Finally, even if international law did allow such at-
tacks in certain situations, the Indonesian invasion was still illegal be-
cause it was wholly disproportionate to whatever "threat" existed. 69
D. "Humanitarian" Intervention
The final defense suggested by Indonesian statements is that the in-
vasion was undertaken to rectify inhuman conditions in East Timor.170
Five standards have been used to evaluate the legitimacy of a putative
humanitarian intervention:171
(1) an immediate and extensive threat to fundamental human rights,
as a matter of principle and policy, anticipatory self-defense is open to certain objections. It
involves a determination of the certainty of attack, which is extremely difficult to make, and
necessitates an attempt to ascertain the intention of a government. This process may lead to
a serious conflict if there is a mistaken assessment of a situation. Id. at 259. In the modem
era, the right of anticipatory self-defense has been under general attack, leading one jurist to
conclude that U.N. Charter Article 51 does not permit anticipatory action. Id. at 278. An-
other jurist notes that the United Nations' refusal to give rein to the doctrine should be
viewed merely as reluctance on its part to encourage use of the right rather than a restriction
of the right as laid down in The Caroline. J. MOORE, 2 DIG. OF INT'L L. 409 (1906); R.
HIGGINS, supra note 137, at 203.
168. See text accompanying notes 149-50 supra.
169. The border clashes in East Timor began shortly after the end of the civil war in the
colony in mid-September, 1975. Full-scale fighting took place in the border town of Batu-
gade in mid-October. Issue on East Timor, supra note 4, at 26. It was also reported that in
early October, Indonesia had seized three towns across the border. Kamm, supra note 1, at
58. Indonesia accused the FRETILIN forces of frequent border violations and the bom-
bardment of towns inside Indonesian Timor. Issue on East Timor, supra note 4, at 27. The
border clashes between FRETILIN forces and Indonesia lasted for just over two months
before the Indonesian invasion. No evidence appears in the record to indicate that FRE-
TILIN attempted to occupy any part, substantial or otherwise, of Indonesian Timor. Nor
has Indonesia attempted to assert such a claim. In the absence of evidence to indicate a full-
scale invasion contemplated by or attempted by FRETILIN, Indonesia's intervention on
December 7, 1975, was certainly disproportionate to the threat presented by the border
clashes. See notes 150-51 supra.
170. In the General Assembly, Indonesia argued that "[a]s a result of the fighting in
Portuguese Timor, Indonesia was confronted with serious difficulties. First, the thousands
of refugees had to be fed and cared for; they were prepared to return to their villages if
Indonesia could guarantee their safety." 30 U.N. GAOR, C.4 (2180th mtg.) 356, 357, U.N.
Doc. A/C.4/30/SR. 2180 (1975). This argument was made on December 3, 1975, four days
before the invasion. It was repeated almost verbatim in the Security Council two weeks
later. See 30 U.N. SCOR (1864th mtg.) 37, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1864 (1975).
171. "Humanitarian intervention" is the threat or use of armed force by a state, group of
states, a belligerent community,'or an international organization, with the object of protect-
ing human rights. See Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE
MODERN WORLD 217 (J. Moore ed. 1974). Humanitarian intervention as a justification for
intervention has been the subject of much study and scholarly writing. See, e.g., HUMANI-
TARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS (R. Lillich ed. 1973); Lillich, Forcible
Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV. 325 (1967); Franck & Rodley,
After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force, 67 AM. J. INT'L
L. 275 (1973); Lillich, Intervention to Protect Human Rights, 15 MCGILL L. J. 205 (1969).
The current debate centers on the doctrine's existence as much as its contemporary rele-
vance. Historically, there have been several cases where intervention allegedly occurred for
humanitarian purposes. See M. GANJI, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
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particularly a threat of widespread loss of human life; (2) a proportional
use of force which does not threaten greater destruction of values than the
human rights at stake; (3) a minimal effect on authority structures;
(4) a prompt disengagement, consistent with the purpose of the action;
and (5) immediate full reporting to the Security Council and appropri-
ate regional organizations.' 7 2
Some jurists have suggested additional standards, including the relative
disinterestedness of the state invoking the coercive measures.
173
There is little if any dispute that the people of East Timor had been,
prior to the Indonesian invasion, living in conditions of abject pov-
erty. 174 There is no evidence, however, to suggest that those conditions
rose to the level of human rights violations. Inhuman conditions that
would have constituted human rights violations arose primarily as a
result of the Indonesian invasion. 175 Yet, even assuming the prior
existence of human rights violations in East Timor, Indonesia's inter-
vention failed to meet any of the other conditions. There is no evi-
dence to indicate that Indonesia solicited the support of the U.N. or
other multinational organizations.' 76 Its use of force was not propor-
tional to humanitarian objectives. 177 Indeed, rather than correcting the
inhuman conditions in East Timor, it aggravated, prolonged, and prob-
ably created those conditions. 78 Nor was the use of force terminated
22-24, 26-37, 39-41. But see Franck & Rodley, supra ("examples" of humanitarian interven-
tion do not support this doctrine).
172. Moore, The Control of Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflict, 9 VA. J. INT'L L.
205, 264 (1969).
173. Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownle anda Pleafor Construc-
tive Alternatives, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 229, 248 (J. Moore ed.
1974). See also Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the lbos in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 167, 193 (R. Lillich ed. 1973); Lillich, Forcible
Self-Hel by States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IowA L. REv. 325, 347-51 (1967); Nanda,
The United States'Action in the 1965 Dominican Crisis.* Impact on World Order, 43 DENVER
L. J. 439, 475 (1966).
174. N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1975, at A2, col. 3.
175. See note 1 supra.
176. Indonesia's only contact with the U.N. came after the invasion, when in the Fourth
Committee, the General Assembly and the Security Council, it attempted to justify its inter-
vention on the grounds stated throughout this Article. See 30 U.N. GAOR, C.4 (2185th
mtg.) 397, 400, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/SR.2185 (1975); 30 U.N. GAOR (2439th plen. mtg.) 42,
U.N. Doc. A/PV. 2439 (1975); 30 U.N. SCOR (1864th mtg.) 31, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1864
(1975).
177. On December 7, 1975, the day of the Indonesian invasion, there did not exist in
East Timor conditions which would have warranted a use of force for humanitarian reasons.
FRETILIN was in control of East Timor. There were no reports of violations of human
rights perpetrated by the FRETILIN administration. See Issue on East Timor, supra note 4,
at 23. A proportional response to the problem of starvation in East Timor certainly would
not include a full-scale invasion and occupation.
178. See note 1 supra; Issue on East Timor, supra note 4, at 34-35.
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as soon as the objectives of the intervention had been achieved. 179 Fi-
nally, in view of the annexation of East Timor, °80 Indonesia cannot
reasonably maintain that humanitarian concern was its primary motive
for the invasion. Annexation is not a necessary or collateral conse-
quence of humanitarian intervention. '8 1 Viewed as an independent ba-
sis for invading East Timor, the annexation casts significant doubts on
the "humanitarian" nature of Indonesia's invasion. 82
It should also be noted that the defense of humanitarian intervention
is not explicitly recognized in the U.N. Charter. The failure to include
a provision expressly recognizing the defense has led some jurists to
argue that the Charter does not recognize the doctrine as justification
for unilateral armed interventions. 8 3 In this event, of course, Indone-
sia's claim that humanitarian considerations motivated its invasion is
irrelevant.
Conclusion
Indonesia's armed attack on East Timor and denial of self-determi-
nation to the East Timorese flagrantly violated international law. Self-
determination was denied by the Indonesian annexation of East Timor
and Indonesia's attempts to justify the annexation on the grounds that
the East Timorese had expressed a willingness to be "reintegrated,"
179. Indonesian forces remain in East Timor even though resistance from FRETILIN
forces has all but ceased. Kamm, supra note 1, at 35.
180. See note 44 supra.
181. On the contrary, annexation is in complete violation of the notions of "prompt
disengagement" and "minimal effect on authority structures." See text accompanying note
172 supra.
182. The dubious nature of intervention as a basis for annexation is clear when consid-
ered in the context of India's intervention in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Gross viola-
tions of human rights were prevalent within East Pakistan and refugees were crossing the
Indian border in larger numbers. Nevertheless, India made no effort to incorporate East
Pakistan into its territory. See Franck & Rodley, stjora note 171; Nanda, Self-Determination
in International Law, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 321 (1972).
183. This proposition is debatable. Brownlie maintains that state practice in the period
of the U.N. Charter does not establish an interpretation of the Charter favorable to interven-
tion to protect human rights. Brownlie, supra note 171, at 222. A number of leading mod-
em authorities either make no mention of humanitarian intervention and take a general
position that militates against its legality, or expressly deny its existence. J. BRIERLY, THE
LAW OF NATIONS 309-10 (5th ed. 1955); P. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 157-58
(1956); Bishop, General Course of Public International Law, 115 RECUEIL DES COURs 423-41
(1965); H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 58-87 (2d rev. ed. 1968). Other
modem authorities have rejected the notion that the U.N. Charter prohibits intervention for
humanitarian purposes, see, e.g., McDougal, Authority to Use Force on the High Seas, 20
NAVAL WAR C. REV. 19, 28-29 (1967); W. REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION 848-50 (1971);
Lillich, Intervention to Protect Human Rights, 15 McGILL L.J. 205, 230 (1969), and have
developed criteria by which to assess claims of humanitarian intervention, see id. at 248;
Nanda, supra note 173, at 475; Reisman, supra note 173, at 193.
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that historical, ethnic, and cultural ties between Indonesia and East Ti-
mor existed, and that East Timor had no economic viability are factu-
ally and legally unsupportable. Similarly, Indonesia cannot justify its
invasion of East Timor by arguing self-defense, invitation, long-term
regional security considerations, or humanitarian intervention. Again,
the factual and legal support for these arguments does not exist.
In spite of the weakness of its legal position, Indonesia has had the
diplomatic support of a number of fellow Islamic states and of fellow
members of ASEAN and OPEC, 184 as well as the "understanding" of
its neighbors, Australia and New Zealand, and its ally, the United
States. 18 5 At the time of this writing, there is nothing concrete to show
for the widely touted initiative by the Portuguese government of Sep-
tember 12, 1980, whereby Lisbon reaffirmed the Timorese right to self-
determination and pledged itself to work with all interested countries
towards a settlement. 8 6 Nevertheless, Portugal's insistence in not giv-
ing recognition to the Indonesian takeover represents a major barrier to
Indonesia's efforts to have the matter slip away completely from world
attention and scrutiny.
184. See note 67 supra.
185. Each of these countries has what appears to it to be perfectly adequate political
reasons for not wanting to enrage Indonesia. Each is staunchly anti-Communist and views
Indonesia as an ally in this cause. Each has an interest in Indonesian oil. Indonesia is not
currently a substantial source of oil for any of them, but it is an important insurance supply
in the event of difficulties in the Middle East. Australia expects that Indonesia might take a
favorable position in shelf delimitation negotiations, see note 29 supra, although negotia-
tions on the delimitation of the continental shelf between Australia and Timor are still con-
tinuing with the Indonesians. The Law of the Sea negotiations play a role in United States
relations with Indonesia. Apparently, Indonesia acquiesces in the United States' position
that its submarines do not have to surface when passing through international straits such as
those joining the Indian and Pacific Oceans, which are in waters claimed by Indonesia as
archipelagic waters. See M. LEIFER, INTERNATIONAL STRAITS OF THE WORLD 160-68
(1978). Daniel Patrick Moynihan, former United States Representative to the United Na-
tions, boasted of the way in which he helped keep the issue of East Timor muted in Decem-
ber, 1975. Concerning the questions of East Timor and Western Sahara, he has written:
China altogether backed Fretilin in Timor, and lost. In Spanish Sahara, Russia just as
completely backed Algeria, and its front, known as Polisario, and lost. In both in-
stances the United States wished things to turn out as they did, and worked to bring this
about. The Department of State desired that the United Nations prove utterly ineffec-
tive in whatever measures it undertook. The task was given to me, and I carried it
forward with no inconsiderable success.
D. MOYNIHAN, A DANGEROUS PLACE 247 (1978).
186. See Letter dated September 17, 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Portu-
gal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/35/2
(1980). The notion of an ousted colonial power returning to complete the decolonization
process might have been completely discounted had it not been for the precedent of the
British return to Rhodesia/Zimbabwe to supervise the elections there notwithstanding an
absence of fifteen years. In an interview with the author on January 15, 1981, Mr. Ramos
Horta of FRETILIN did not preclude the possibility of a transitional role for Portugal
should the Indonesians be dislodged.
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The United Nations has been the main forum for discussion of the
Timor issue. What conclusions can be drawn about its role in the af-
fair? The Security Council has not discussed the item since April, 1976,
which probably indicates that the votes are simply not there to put it on
the agenda, let alone to adopt a substantive resolution. But the Special
Committee on Decolonization and the Fourth Committee of the Gen-
eral Assembly continue to hold annual debates on the whole question
and to adopt appropriate resolutions. In short, the fact that Indonesia
has acted contrary to international law has been reiterated-perhaps
not with enthusiasm but reiterated nonetheless-each time the organi-
zation has considered the matter. In the face of slow diplomatic ero-
sion, supporters of self-determination and independence for the East
Timorese must take some comfort from the retention of the item on the
international agenda. Sometimes in the symbolic world of diplomacy,
keeping the matter "under review" is about the nearest thing to a sanc-
tion that can be achieved. In the broad sweep of history, keeping the
item alive may provide some moral suasion aiding the eventual capitu-
lation of Indonesia. 87 The United Nations has shown some capacity to
stick with intractable hard cases. One is reminded of the fact that the
organization persisted with the question of the Portuguese territories
and with the racist Rhodesian regime for nearly two decades, in situa-
tions where it appeared that nothing would be done about either of
those two matters. The organization has persisted with the Southwest
Africa/Namibia question for three and one-half decades, with the end
still not in sight. East Timor seems destined to join Namibia as an
issue that simply refuses to go away.
187. As long as the item remains on the agenda of the General Assembly as a
decolonization issue it is hard for the Indonesians to claim that their annexation has been
accepted by the world community. Retention of the matter on the agenda represents a kind
of sanction to back up Article 5.3 of the General Assembly's Definition of Aggression, see
note 132 supra, which provides that "[n]o territorial acquisition or special advantage result-
ing from aggression shall be recognized as lawful," and its Declaration on the Strengthening
of International Security, G.A. Res. 2734, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 22, U.N. Doe. A/
8028 (1970), which provides that "no territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use
of force shall be recognized as legal." Id. para. 5. In the long term, states tend to ignore
black letter proscription against the recognition of forceful acquisition of territory. See gen-
eraly, SUTER, supra note 1, at 5-8 (Australian defacto recognition of Indonesia's authority
over East Timor, Australia's recognition and later de-recognition of Soviet control over the
Baltic states); Human Rights in East Timor. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International
Organizations of the House Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 app.
(1977) (United States refusal to recognize Soviet incorporation of the Baltic states; more
ambiguous American behavior concerning East Timor and Western Sahara).
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